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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a case study of the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) for the US Army 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and the application of acquisition reform and accelerated 
acquisition. This thesis identifies the acquisition reform initiatives that were applied to 
develop and procure an ACAT ID major weapon system within 16 months. In 1999, the 
Army Chief of Staff, GEN Shinseki, stated his vision for a transformed Army that would 
be based on a lighter, more lethal, faster deployable, and highly mobile force that could 
arrive anywhere in the world within 96 hours. Centered on the procurement of six 
brigades of IAVs, each brigade contains a measured mix of 10 combat and combat 
support vehicles based on a nearly common platform. The BCT procurement of IAVs is 
the interim solution and is a vanguard to the Army's transformation. The culmination of 
the transformation will be the Objective Force, scheduled to be operational in the year 
2020. The IAV procurement, therefore, was not intended as a developmental program 
but an integration of existing off-the-shelf capabilities that balanced cost, schedule, and 
performance in the best available vehicle system. The procurement relied on multiple 
acquisition reform means to accelerate the requirements development, and solicitation, to 
enable the delivery of the best available product to the Army. The initiatives employed to 
make this award form the primary research question, "What has been the impact of DoD 
acquisition reform on the development of the Brigade Combat Team?" 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.        GENERAL 
A program like the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) only comes along once in one's 
career. Formerly known as the Medium Combat Team (MCT) and the Medium Weight 
Brigade, it is now commonly known as "the Brigade" or BCT. Like the Bradley Fighting 
Vehicle and the Abrams Tank programs before it, those involved considered the 
experience one of the most worthwhile efforts in which they had ever participated. 
Recent retirees from these programs have seen their systems come from Cold War pipe 
dreams to reality. Those supporting the BCT program are just beginning to appreciate 
what they went through. Today, the Army stands on the threshold of a series of new 
programs. With these programs becoming reality, they will likely stand back 20 years 
from now and say, "We have contributed to something worthwhile." Our goal, of course, 
is more than just retirement, it is to deliver a product through such a program that saves 
soldiers lives, helps to build democracy, and in the end, saves others' lives too. 
The four of the last six Chiefs of Staff of the Army have identified potential force 
changes, to include medium forces that could rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. 
Their efforts were not successful in that they failed to transform the Army. They 
envisioned forces that would deploy rapidly and hold ground until heavy forces could be 
shipped to the conflict, but were not intended to win wars. Our current Chief of Staff is 
leading the Army in transforming itself into a force capable of winning wars. 
On 12 October 1999, when speaking to the Association of United States Army 
(AUSA), the Army's Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, stated that he had a new Army 
vision that was based on a lighter, more lethal, faster deployable, highly mobile force that 
can arrive anywhere in the world within 96 hours (Shinseki, GEN, October 1999). 
Once there, the brigades would aggressively carryout missions supporting the 
National Military Authority ranging from Stability and Support Operations (SASO) 
through Small Scale Contingency (SSC) and up to and including, with augmentation, 
Major Theatre War (MTW). They will be much more substantial than the airborne 
forces, such as the 82nd Airborne Division, which provide today's strategic quick-reaction 
response without having the enormous logistics burden of today's armor force. Although 
they perform the forced entry and insertion role better than any army in the world does, 
the 82" doesn't have organic staying power that comes with armored combat vehicles. 
The new BCT force will be an organic, self-reliant force that only foolish third world 
tyrants will think of tangling with for fear of receiving a unique site visit within four days 
of their latest tirade. 
This is not to say that the new brigades will be the only combat force projection 
forces. General Shinseki's intent is to strategically place adequate forces where the 
National Command Authority needs them when they need them there.   The early entry 
forces such as the Army Rangers, Marine Corps intrusion forces, and the 82nd Airborne 
Division will all still be strategic assets that will often be employed first.   Close on their 
heels will be the new brigades providing the deployable punch that only it can deliver. 
General Shinseki's audience at AUSA was comprised of two main groups.   First, 
the Army's past leaders who formed the knowledge base on which his decision was based 
and second on the future Army leaders who will carry out his vision.   Both have 
influenced, and continue to influence, the Army's Transformation. 
B.        OBJECTIVES 
My research will investigate application of acquisition reform to major system 
procurement.   It will be woven into a case study of the processes and initiatives evoked. 
My focus will be on what the Army, specifically the PMO, employed to develop an 
ACAT ED major weapon system program and award a production contract within 16 
months after program initiation.   I will also investigate what has been done to set the 
program up for success.   My research will also include a discussion of the relative 
hindrances encountered using such processes.   Due to the fast pace of the program, I 
anticipate using an iterative approach to completing my thesis.   During the year, I will 
perform a circuitous review of the research questions and intended outcomes and will 
revise my focus accordingly. 
C.        RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the primary research question was: 
What has been the impact of Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition reform on the 
development of the Brigade Combat Team? From the basic research question, the 
following subsidiary questions were developed: 
1. What is the Brigade Combat Team: Background and overview? 
2. What attributes of acquisition reform are relevant to the BCT? 
3. What areas of acquisition reform are being employed to execute the program? 
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages that acquisition reform brings to 
the BCT? 
5. What conclusions and follow-on recommendations can be drawn from 
applying acquisition reform to the BCT? 
D.       ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Three primary assumptions have been made relevant to this study.   First, the 
reader understands basic acquisition theories, milestones, and programmatic 
requirements. Second, the General Accounting Office (GAO) will publish its opinion in 
late March 2001 that is favorable to the Army and its choice for the vehicle platform. 
Third, the protestor will not take their case to Federal Court; further litigation will tend to 
overwhelm the acceleration and reform benefits achieved. Finally, that current timelines 
will be adhered to. Had the Army followed historical acquisition policies and 
procedures, there is no foreseeable way for them to have achieved what they have, but the 
likelihood of a protest at the point of the production contract award would be much less. 
E.   METHODOLOGY 
The data for this study were obtained from several sources. First, the researcher 
conducted an extensive review of available programmatic documents, briefings, and 
acquisition literature. Further external literature reviews consisted of library searches, 
reviews of internal and external Government data sources, extensive use of the Internet, 
and experiential data collection while supporting execution of the program. Second, 
several interviews were conducted with various individuals involved in DoD acquisition 
policy at the program and major subordinate command levels. 
F.        THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of five chapters. This chapter provides the objectives, scope, 
and methodology for collecting pertinent data. Chapter II provides an overview of 
proposed BCT as it contributes to the Army Transformation. The Army will provide an 
evolutionary application of technology, training, and time to transform from an Initial 
Brigade Combat Team to the Interim Brigade Combat Team. Initially, they will use 
surrogate vehicles and evolving tactics, techniques and procedures, and then transition to 
the Interim solution with deliberately purchased systems that meet all the users 
requirements. Eventually, with the application of more time and resources, the Army will 
transform itself much further into its Objective Force as the pinnacle of the Army 
Transformation. 
Chapter III provides an overview of the applicable acquisition reform initiatives 
and accelerated acquisition employed such as requirements generation; market survey; 
major program realignments to set fiscal resources; total Army support, staffing, and 
facilitization; Draft RFPs with Question and Answer; performance specifications; model 
contracting; non-developmental and commercially available products with modification; 
discussions; and contract award. 
Chapter IV discusses respective advantages and disadvantages experienced 
through employment of acquisition reform and accelerated acquisition such as the 
compelling and conflicting requirements; disparities in proposals; acquisition speed v. 
program risks; and Performance, Schedule, and Cost Trade-offs. Chapter V discusses the 
conclusions and recommendations for follow-on analysis that include the contract award 
protest and its affect on the overall program; the respective protest GAO Hearing and 
resolution; and the follow-on research and analysis issues. 
II. THE PROPOSED BCT AS IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE ARMY 
TRANSFORMATION 
A.        INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is the spearhead of the Army's transformation. 
The Army has purposely identified the initial and the interim forces with the same 
acronym. For this paper, I will use the terms Initial IBCT (Initial Brigade Combat Team) 
and IBCT (Interim Brigade Combat Team) to delineate the difference. On Figure 1 
below, the transformation starts with the Initial IBCT, and evolves to the IBCT. At a 
distant time in the future, the Army will break-point the IBCT before 
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Lethal, Survivable, Sustainable. 
1 Brigade - 96 Hours 1 Division - 120 Hours 5 Division - 30 Days 
Figure 1 - Army Transformation Slide (From Ref. US Army Transformation Web Page) 
completing the evolution into the Objective Force. There is not one singular path to the 
Objective Force, but three simultaneous paths that contribute key components, 
fundamental capabilities, and doctrinal evolution. 
The PM-BCT Charter contains the following excerpts with regard to what the 
Interim, Initial, and Objective Forces will achieve (PM-BCT Charter, 2000): 
The IBCT will contain three subparts, the Initial IBCT, the EBCT, and then unit 
collective training. Initial IBCT will establish, "an initial capability utilizing off-the-shelf 
equipment and some brigade organic equipment." It is a developmental, "guide for 
selection of surrogate equipment and support its fielding, to include organizational design 
validation." It includes, "reorganizing, and then conducting developmental training of 
the first EBCT using loaner and surrogate equipment." 
The IBCT is, "fielding (Total Package Fielding) of the procured MAV, including 
New Equipment Training (NET), and new organizational team training (NOTT)." The 
initial IBCT and the BCT, "will not be immediately deployable/employable." 
The third part consists of unit collective training that follows fielding. The 
Gaining units must undergo "unit collective training, culminating in a capstone exercise. 
Upon completion of this part, the brigade will be deployable/employable." 
I'll start by describing the IBCT, as it is most pertinent to this thesis, then discuss 
the Initial IBCT, the Objective Force, and then wrap up this chapter with a discussion of 
the Army Transformation. The BCT is a self-contained fighting force that is capable of 
sustained combat operations and is capable of being deployed anywhere in the world in 
96 hours. 
1. What is a BCT? 
To best answer the question about what an Interim Brigade Combat Team is, we 
must first look to the key materiel and combat developers. COL Schenk, the original 
Program Manager, Brigade Combat Team (PM-BCT) provided a media briefing on 24 
May 2000 at Aberdeen Proving Ground wherein his summary slide explained that the 
BCT supports the Army leadership's plan for transformation, fields a responsive force in 
the near-term, and provides a force that fulfills fundamental warfighting imperatives. He 
also stated that the BCT is a force, not just equipment. It provides a broad range of 
strategic options to the National Command Authority; it encompasses capabilities and 
characteristics that are needed in the interim but are not available today, by employing 
off-the-shelf equipment that allows the army to respond immediately to current 
operational requirements (COL Schenk, May 2000). 
COL Rodriquez, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
System Manager for the Interim Armored Vehicle (TSM-IAV) defined it best by 
describing what the IBCT is not. He stated that the IBCT brigade is not built to fight 
head on with conventional Russian tanks. (COL Rodriguez, October 2001) 
LTG Kern, on the day of the IAV contract award, provided this description of the 
BCT that differentiates it from previous attempts at transformation, "This is not an 
experimental force, rather it represents a force capable of meeting the needs of regional 
commanders in chief, while concurrently assisting the Army in concurrent development 
of 21st century doctrine to meet the 21st century threats" (Kern, LTG November, 2000). 
This is consistent with the Army transformation Campaign Plan where the Initial BCT 
Charter explicitly states that this is not an experimental force. (BCT Charter, 2000). 
The literature provided by HQTRADOC for the Platform Performance 
Demonstration described the BCT as a "full-spectrum, conventional combat force 
organized and equipped under a division headquarters. It is designed and optimized for 
employment in small-scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain, and 
built to confront low-end and mid-range threats that may employ asymmetrical 
capabilities" (TRADOC Handout, December 1999). 
The Brigade Combat Team will contain two basic variants, an Infantry Carrier 
Vehicle (ICV) and a Mobile Gun System (MGS). The ICV has eight additional 
configurations, the 120 mm Mortar Carrier (MC) vehicle, Anti-Tank Guided Missile 
(ATGM) vehicle, the Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), the Commander's Vehicle (CV), the 
Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), the Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), the Nuclear Biological 
and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) and the Medical Evacuation Vehicle 
(MEV). Figure 2 below provides an IBCT Organizational wire diagram. 
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The following are excerpts from the Initial Brigade Combat Team program 
literature provided at the December 1999 Industry Day (TRADOCIBCT Handout, 
December 1999). The words in Italics are the key enablers from GEN Shinseki's Army 
Transformation Vision. The literature provided that there will be a total of 2131IAV 
vehicles in the brigade providing a balanced mix of the configurations from Figure 2. 
Using Air Force strategic deployment assets, the IBCT will deploy rapidly as a combat 
unit and immediately begin combat operations; objectively anywhere in the world within 
96 hours. The BCT brings to the fight an agile response that is prepared to transition 
from peacekeeping to combat and back without augmentation. It will contain a versatile 
capability to respond to escalating crisis. It brings overwhelming lethality to deter 
aggression. It has enhanced survivability through speed and situational awareness, and 
comes prepared for the fight with enhanced sustainment. 
The operational Requirement Paragraph of the Acquisition Strategy Report 
further refines these key enablers as the ability to be strategically deployed (C-17/C-5) 
combat ready, strategically responsive and versatile, self-contained and self reliant, air 
deployable by C-130 and ready for immediate combat operations, logistically supportable 
with a minimized footprint, operational mobile across the breadth of the battlefield in 
complex, urban, and rolling terrain, and jointly operable (Acquisition Strategy Report, 17 
March 2000). With the organic assets in place, the Army will be able to support National 
Military Strategy by providing a real-world deterrence force that also carries the 
capability to take in foes with superior numbers and equipment. The Army vision is 
12 
based on this concept and the BCT organization and structure is therefore critical to 
achieving the Army's vision (Acquisition Strategy Report, 17 March 2000). 
The IAV contract, awarded in November 2000, contains an eight-year period of 
performance to cover six brigade sets wherein each interim armored vehicle (IAV) 
variant/configuration is fixed price by ordering period. The contract also includes 
development, New Equipment Training, Instructor & Key Personnel Training, Material 
Fielding, Contractor Logistics & maintenance support, refurbishment of bid samples & 
test vehicles, and retrofits for block improvements. It is more than just IAV vehicles, 
which is the combat platform. It also requires a light to medium-weight "sustainment" 
force based on existing Army assets such as HMMWV, FMTV, and HEMMT tactical 
trucks and systems. 
The first two brigades are being established at Ft. Lewis, Washington with efforts 
started nearly immediately after GEN Shinseki's AUSA brief. As I will describe below, 
the soldiers are training on surrogate, loaned, and leased equipment. They are training to 
new BCT doctrine and are helping to validate that doctrine so that when they receive 
their IBCT equipment, the learning curve will be very steep to quickly bring their units to 
operational status. 
2. Medium Weight Vehicles 
The insertion of medium forces into the US Army is not a new idea. Four of the 
last six Chiefs of Staff of the Army (CSA) have initiated similar transformations of the 
13 
Army with varying degrees of success. In order they were, the 9th infantry Division 
Motorized (GEN Meyer and GEN Wickham), Task Force XXI (GEN Vuono), Strike 
Force (GEN Reimer), and Medium Combat Team (GEN Shinseki). These all now yield 
to the Interim Brigade Combat Team as it was named in December 1999. Ironically, the 
previous attempts at deriving a new Army all contained the similar intent as the IBCT 
today. In fact, we find key words describing, deployability, lethality, speed, and mobility 
intertwined in each of these efforts. 
a) The Motorized Experience 
These words were a driving force behind the largest transformation that 
occurred in the last century, the motorized concepts in the 9th ID (Motorized) (Bowman, 
Kendall, and Saunders, Jun 1989). Building on concepts that supported the successes of 
the 9t Motorized, Strike Force was developed around the idea of modular force 
components that came together to respond to and solve a worldwide contingency. The 
Strike Force efforts were detailed under then CSA Gen. Reimer (Miller, December 1998). 
The effort was concepted to include a fast deployment time, flexible (meaning "agile") 
response, full spectrum firepower, scaleable strategic response, and CONUS based 
headquarters (Gordon and Wilson, May 98). The effort eventually evolved to become 
only the Headquarters element ofthat force and had stagnated there when GEN Shinseki 
took over as the CSA in June 1999. The Medium Combat Team that evolved to the IBCT 
contained most of the same facets as Strike Force along with a few more. I will cover 
this in more depth in Section 3 below. 
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What separates the D3CT from the previous attempts was the lack of 
vision of the primary Army leadership at the time from Brigade Commanders on up. 
(Peters, Dec 99). Army branch-hardened traditionalists fought hard to continue the 
delineation of their own branches similar to Congressional "pork barrel" politics (Gordon 
and Wilson, May 98). Their opinion was that each branch has its own role on the 
battlefield and they are separate and distinct with the exception of Task Force and Team 
concepts where branch systems are combined to solve a specific operational shortcoming. 
This is especially true of the Armor and Infantry communities that have historically 
wrestled for development funds for major programs. To these individuals, armor is 
armor and infantry is infantry. 
b) 21s' Century Shortcomings 
As recently as the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, our shortcomings in 
handling quick erupting and fierce regional conflicts were clearly evident and helped to 
define the shortcomings of both Heavy and Light Army forces. Commonly described as 
a "barbell", the current Army contains only one division that come close to medium 
forces and that is the 101st Air Assault Division (Gordon and Wilson, May 1998, page 3). 
The 101 Air Assault Division comes closest to a medium force, but is unfortunately 
encumbered by the same extended logistics tail as the heavy forces. Therefore, it is not 
as strategically deployable as the Army needs. 
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c) Real World Problems 
In Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the Army heavy force needed to oust Mr. 
Milosovic would have been too slow in strategically deploying and getting to the fight 
with enough equipment to be useful. This was highlighted in a New York Times article 
at the time that the US was making plans for a ground invasion force into Kosovo when 
the Army, ".. .suddenly discovered that, without significant new road work, the large 
American Ml Abrams tanks could not negotiate the single route from Albania into 
Kosovo." (New York Times On Line, November 1999). Light forces would not have 
carried enough punch to be effective either. The 82nd Airborne Division could have been 
deployed to oust Milosovic but would not have been supportable if the Yugoslav army 
attacked with its own armor forces. 
This was the very similar scenario that the 82nd Airborne Division faced in 
Operation Desert Storm in 1990. Although considered the best strategic quick 
deployment force in the world, the 82nd Airborne Division would have had great 
difficulty repelling determined Iraqi armored forces due to their lack of anti-armor 
capability. Gordon and Wilson described this in 1998 when they supported the need for 
Medium Forces, "While the 82nd Airborne did deploy, it quickly assumed the title of 
"speed bump" in the face of an enemy with huge numbers of armored vehicles" (Gordon 
and Wilson, May 1998, Page 6). These same criticisms appeared in the 1992 
Congressional after action report wherein they also illuminated the strategic capabilities 
and shortcomings of the 82nd Airborne (House of Representatives, March 1992). 
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SMA Jack L. Tilley stated it quite simply in a recent letter to all Army 
soldiers that he published over the Internet. Speaking of the basic reasoning for the Army 
transformation and other new policies, he explained, "Nobody will ever know for certain 
why Saddam stopped when he had our forces outgunned and outnumbered. Far more 
certain is the fact that the next dictator to challenge us won't repeat Saddam's mistakes. 
When future foes mobilize their forces, they will likely move quickly while hoping they 
can achieve their objectives before we can deploy our forces." (Tilley, SMA, May 2001) 
d) Repeated Attempts at Medium 
The Army has repeatedly studied the prospect of developing and fielding a 
medium force that fills the void between heavy and light forces. In fact, they were 
building the "Headquarters" for Strike Force; a force similar to the 9th ID (Motorized) 
from the late 1980's. Originally based on the concept of a family of vehicle variants on a 
common chassis, a Strike Force Headquarters was to be located at Ft. Polk, LA starting in 
October of 1998. It found its demise in the fervor of the Medium Combat Team in the 
fall of 1999. The significant fact for the Strike Force program, was that it became a 
"headquarters" for carrying out regional conflict management rather than an actual stand- 
alone deployable force. The Army was unable to figure out how to restructure itself 
effectively or, more importantly, to develop and employ a füll force cost effectively. 
Clearly to the Army management, something more radical had to be done. 
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e) Basic Medium Vehicle Requirements 
Once again, the Army derived the Strike Force requirements around such 
capabilities as, light weight armor protection - 7.62 mm ball; underbody blast protection 
- mine survivability; upgrade to improved ballistic protection - scaleable applique armor; 
C-130 transportable - deployable worldwide; and high speed - increased mobility. The 
Army planned a two-phased solicitation, which was divided between a 48-month force 
development and production vehicle deliveries 16 months after contract award (Strike 
Force Market Survey, October 1998). The planned Phase II solicitation included less 
than 350 vehicles in 11 variants: Medium Armored Fighting Vehicle, Reconnaissance 
Vehicle, Medium Armored ATGM Vehicle, Personnel Carrier, Logistic Resupply 
Vehicle, Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, Ambulance Vehicle, Medical Treatment 
Vehicle, Command and Control Vehicle, 120 mm Mortar Vehicle, and an 81 mm Mortar 
Vehicle. As evidenced by the market survey results (Figure 3), numerous similarities 
exist between the original Strike Force plan and the BCT as it is known today. 
3. Medium Combat Team 
The incoming Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki hinted at the vastness 
of his plans soon after assuming his new duties in the summer of 1999. He specified his 
intent for restructuring the heavy and light forces as, ".. .more strategically deployable 
and more agile forces with a smaller footprint.. .more lethal, survivable and tactically 
mobile. Achieving this paradigm will require innovative thinking about force structure, 
modernization efforts and spending." (Shinseki, GEN, 23 June 1999). The words he used 
then evolved into his October 1999 AUSA speech that rocked the Army's core. He stated 
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concept. The Army needed to break paradigms about armored combat that had thrived 
for most of the twentieth century. TRADOC summarized the effort as needing to, 
"Analyze force effectiveness and organization implications of medium brigade design 
alternatives at the tactical level within context of Small Scale Contingencies and Major 
Theater Wars." Their efforts continued on from the studies performed to support the 
Army's Strike Force efforts from the summer of 1999. 
Although not as radical as the restructuring that COL Macgregor called for in his 
1997 book, "Breaking the Phalanx," (Macgregor, 1997) the Army will employ some of 
Macgregor's basic thought processes. I am sure more than one offeror for the BCT 
acquisition has researched the "Phalanx" concepts in preparing for the BCT solicitation. 
COL Macgregor called for breaking the Army into deployable "combat groups." Many 
of the same qualities that COL Macgregor identified for the combat groups are evident in 
the overarching concepts of the BCT such as, smaller contingency forces that are 
CONUS based, lower level command and control responsibilities, increased operational 
and tactical mobility, lethality that dominates a terrain or geography, and brigade sized 
element self-sustaining operations for increased initial periods (more than 72 hours). 
There are divergences that senior Army leadership have purposely neglected to consider 
that generally fall into the "never under my watch category." Macgregor has been 
somewhat critical of the Army's plans since they did not include enough emphasis on 
joint service efforts (Inside the Pentagon, 21 December 2000). The Army must therefore 
strive that much harder to prove that this effort is viable and realistic. 
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Having described the precursors of BCT above, in the remaining paragraphs of 
this chapter, I will describe the additional components that make up the transformation 
and then describe the transformation as it affects the Army as a whole. 
B.        INITIAL BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
The Initial D3CT is the true start of the transformation process. Selected units 
turned in their heavy armor trappings in 2000, and took on a new role as the transitional 
force. They literally have been developing new doctrine for the IBCT that employs 
medium weight systems in place of the Ml Abrams, M2 Bradleys, and Ml 09 Howitzers 
that they used to own and operate. 
1. Mission Need 
Defining a mission need is not an easy task to accomplish, but is essential to 
transformation. As described in the 9th ID's experience, the Army did not know what a 
motorized division should look like, so one, "had to be built from the ground up." 
(Bowman, Kendall, and Saunders, June 1989). Equipment was selected to support the 
vision, which of course was purposefully depicted as performance goals rather than 
dictated as specific weapon systems and components. For instance, the 9th ID 
(Motorized) was directed by then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward Meyer to have 
enhanced "mobility and significant armor killing capability" (Bowman, Kendall, and 
Saunders, June 1989). What evolved from that guidance eventually led to the start of the 
Armored Gun System (AGS). Although the AGS system never was fielded to the 9th ID 
(Motorized) and subsequently was canceled after delivery of 6 prototypes in 1995, this is 
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a classic case of form following function as the requirements were derived from 
identified and validated shortcomings. 
2. Development of Doctrine 
The 9th ID's "how-to-fight" plans were directed by a committee called the High 
Technology Test Bed (HTTB), which later was, renamed the Army Development and 
Employment Agency (ADEA). ADEA derived the division's needs into a workable 
Operational and Organizational (O&O) plan, which received certification through 
successful completion of an intensive divisional rotation through the National Training 
Center in 1984. The significance here is that the 9th ID (Motorized) received their 
certification when surrogate vehicles supported nearly all of their intended "materiel 
solutions". The cornerstone HMMWV was not to be fielded until 1986 and the elusive 
AGS was not yet fully funded. In their place, the 9th ID (Motorized) used M882 Dodge 
trucks and Improved TOW Vehicles (ITVs). It is apparent now, and the senior Army 
leadership has recognized, that chipping away at transformation is not the answer. Proof 
is in the principle and according to MG Dubik, the Deputy Commander General for 
Transformation at Ft. Lewis, Washington, "Where we erred in the Ninth was trying to 
change the deploying army without changing all the generating systems associated with 
the deploying army." (Frontline: The Future of War, PBS, October 2000). What fell out 
of the first five years of development, was a motorized division that contained objective 
systems for only one of three of its originally derived platforms. In spite of the 
limitations, the 9th ID (Motorized) became fully operation in October, 1986 (Bowman, 
Kendall, and Saunders, Page 5, June 1989). Although it achieved some moderate 
successes at the National Training Center, it failed to achieve transformation of the Army 
22 
and ceased to exist after 1989 when the Army deactivated the 9th ID (Motorized) in its 
downsizing efforts. 
3. Applied Knowledge 
There are a lot of similarities in the approach that PM-BCT is employing and that 
used by the 9th ID (Motorized) in the late 1980's. The Army's initial IBCT is training 
right now and is developing its own "how-to-fight" doctrine using surrogate or In-Lieu- 
Of (ILO) systems. TRADOC now describes this process as developing TTPs-Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures. The IBCT soldiers are identifying, applying, and revising 
their TTPs routinely to support the evolution of the Objective Force (US Army 
Transformation Campaign Plan, July 2000). In the process, TRADOC is evaluating the 
Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier changes they can 
make to assist in establishing the fighting doctrine of the BCT (BCT Charter, 2000). 
TRADOC employed Senior Warfighter Seminars wherein senior TRADOC officers, 
LTCs, COLs, and GOs, performed analytical and intellectual analysis of the operational 
environment that the BCT would be employed. They then applied professional military 
judgment and backed up their experiences with a multifaceted modeling and simulation 
effort across the spectrum of user representative centers and schools (TRAC JJBCT 
Briefing, 17 November 1999). 
a) "Materiel Catch-up" 
While not part of the formal acquisition process, the Initial IBCT is now 
fully engaged in determining the usefulness of several surrogate systems while they wait 
for the acquisition community to achieve materiel solutions for several systems. For 
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instance, they are using systems borrowed or loaned from other countries. There are 32 
LAV-III vehicles that the Canadian Army loaned the US Army. In service in the 
Canadian army for 2 years (experienced with predecessor equipment for more than 20 
years), the US Army recognized their potential fit with the evolving doctrine and 
contacted the Canadian government. The PM was able to work out a deal where they 
will pay the Canadians for the maintenance and refurbishment of the LAV in vehicles. 
The US Army is also using Italian Centauro 155 mm self-propelled howitzers as 
surrogates to explore some of the howitzer requirements (the BCT is not currently 
acquiring a self-propelled howitzer). 
b) "Surrogate" Surrogates 
The Army also has shuffled its own resources when deciding upon 
surrogate systems. The remaining howitzer requirements are being filled using the Ml98 
towed howitzer borrowed from other units while it waits for the Joint Lightweight 
Howitzer program. Nearly all the Fox NBC recon vehicles in the Army inventory are 
currently being used by the forces at Ft. Lewis as surrogates for the JOBCT's NBC recon 
vehicle. There are numerous brigade capabilities that are being met through the use of 
surrogate "systems" mounted on HMMWVs ILO systems mounted on a medium weight 
chassis. There are also HEMMTs and 5-ton trucks filling in where a lighter weight 
medium chassis will later be used. These are all examples of the surrogate systems the 
Army is using while developing its doctrine. As evidenced by previous transformations, 
most of the surrogates will not remain in the IBCT when it is fully operational. 
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C. OBJECTIVE FORCE 
Officially, the Objective Force encompasses a force of tomorrow that employs 
vehicles known as the Future Combat System (FCS). It is what the Army truly wants 
when it is done transforming from the legacy forces of today, Ml Abram's tanks, M2 
Bradley Fighting Vehicles, M109 Self Propelled Howitzers, and Ml 13 Armored 
Personnel Carriers, through the IBCT and projected in the near future. Concepted 
originally to evolve from the Science and Technology (S&T) base in 2020, FCS is now 
slated to show transition in the 2008 time frame with a technology breakpoint in 2003. 
The significance is depicted in Figure 1 (above) where the bottom arrow depicting the 
IBCT does not connect to the objective force. There is no guaranteed continuum from 
the IBCT to the Objective Force. Systems acquired for the IBCT that are used to evolve 
doctrine may or may not be included in the final Objective Force MTOE. That's not to 
say they cannot be included, but the Army vision for the Objective Force is much more 
radical than the integrated off-the-shelf systems that they could acquire for the IBCT. 
This is not a wheels versus track comparison. This is a program to design a vehicle from 
the ground up that weighs around 16 tons and that truly defines light weight, more agile, 
more lethal, more intelligent, more supportable, and more survivable than any known 
armored system today. FCS was described at their industry day on 11 January 2000 as a, 
"Network Centric Distributed 'Tank'." It carries the IBCT desired capabilities to push 
the envelope of modern technology by requiring lofty programmatic goals contained in 
Table 1 below. 
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• C-130 transportable (<20 tons) (not tradable) 
• 33-50% Decrease in logistics sustainment requirements 
• 50% Decrease in fuel consumption 
• 96 hours rapid response 
• 5 days OPTEMPO operation without resupply 
• 100 KPH burst speeds 
• 60 KPH cross country speed-sustained 
Table 1 - FCS Program Goals (From Ref. FCS Brief, 11 January 2000) 
D. ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
Transformation means different things to different people. According to the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, the real 
definition of transformation, "is what it will take to be effective in tomorrow's battle 
space. Becoming what we're not." (Myers, GEN April 2001). Army Secretary Luis 
Caldera described what the Army would transform into by stating, "We must be a full 
spectrum force in which every unit is capable of contributing along every point of the 
spectrum force from humanitarian system to high intensity conflict (Caldera, Army 
Secretary, 12 October 1999). Transformation includes redistribution offerees, base 
alignment and closure, an improved integration of active and reserve component forces, 
and reorganization and redistribution of pre-positioned equipment overseas. It is 
dependant on dominant maneuver and precision engagement with the lighter more agile, 
deployable, relevant forces and maintaining a wide array of military options to employ in 
a crisis (APS 98, Chapter 1,1998). 
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While this thesis concentrates on the materiel acquisition attributes of the BCT, 
the transformation is much more than materiel. It encompasses a balance between 
readiness, modernization, end strength, and quality of life (APS 98 EXSUM, 1998). 
Although these words were written in 1997 with regard to Force XXI, the emphasis for 
the current Army transformation is still relevant. This emphasis is best captured by the 
Joint Vision 2010 in an operational template (Figure 4) as presented to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the spring of 1996. 
Figure 4 - Joint Vision 2010 (From Ref. Joint Vision 2010, October 1998) 
The basic question then becomes, what is the urgency for transformation and why 
does the Army need to transform? The geostrategic environment has significantly 
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changed in the last 10 years. Referring to Figures 5 and 6 below, the operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO) of deployments has increased from 10 deployments over 40 years (Figure 
5) to more than 28 deployments in eight years (Figure 6) (APS 98, Chapter 4). GEN 
Shinseki pointed out in his address to the 106th Congress that from 1989 the Army has 
further increased OPTEMPO from one deployment every four years to one deployment 
every 14 weeks (Shinseki, GEN, Statement to the 106th Congress, March 2000). 
During these years of increasing OPTEMPO, the Army experimented at 
transformation without implementation. Instead of moving towards better systems, the 
experiments were designed to determine which technological direction to move the 
Army. For example, the Force XXI effort was an interactive and linked series of 
evaluations, exercises and experiments that was planned to influence the critical decisions 
concerning the Army's future organization, training, and doctrine (ASP 98, Chapter 5). 
To drive the point home I am inserting the statement that LTG Kern made on the 
day that the BCT production contract was awarded that, "the BCT is not an experimental 
force." (Kern, LTG, 20 November 2000). The Army, at the time of the ASP 98 (Fc 
XXI timeframe), expected to spend only $1.4 Billion through FY03 on weapon Syste 
for experimentation. In comparison to experimentation, the PM-BCT expects to pay 
approximately $4 Billion for the procurement of the IBCT's six brigades of Interim 




Figure 5 - Army Planned Deployments (After Ref. APS 1998) 
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Figure 6 - Army Deployments Executed (After Ref. APS 1998) 
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GEN Shinseki additionally provided to the 106th Congress that the Army 
Transformation would include a strategically responsive and dominant capability across 
the entire spectrum plus would take care of soldiers (civilians, retirees, veterans, and 
families). He also pledged to still fulfill the Army's ability to fight and win wars. He 
emphasized 100% strength requirement to the warfighting divisions and ACRs within FY 
2000 and pledged to continue to fill the rest of the Army to 100% strength by FY '03. 
The Army has already started these improvements through the use of more recruiting and 
retention incentives such as extending tours and increasing bonuses. The CSA also 
included goals to improve housing, medical care, family programs and modernization of 
the legacy force (Shinseki, GEN, Statement to the 106th Congress, March 2000). 
Modernization will include, "recapitalization and fielding of new, already-programmed 
equipment." 
The transformation will include more than just combat arms; which had been 
described as a primary reason for the downfall of the 9th ID (Motorized) experience in the 
late 1990s. It will include combat and combat service support assets as well as tactical 
and non-tactical systems. 
The Army transformation will not be complete until the last fielding of the FCS, 
which is currently slated for 2025 (FCS Industry Day, 11 Jan 00). The critical path for 
the transformation is therefore rooted in the Science and Technology base. GEN 
Shinseki stated the Army challenge as developing a, "comprehensive set of technological 
answers and R&D plans by 2003." Before that final fielding, the Army leadership will 
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have decided exactly how many FCS brigades it will equip, what the final disposition of 
the IBCT brigades will be and exactly how much of the legacy forces of today, with 
selected upgrade and overhaul, will remain in the Army Active or Reserve inventories. 
What this entails, between now and then, is iterative and recursive applications of CSA's 
visions, Congressional reviews, Presidential Budget Decisions, science and technology 
improvements, technology trade-offs, and real-world applications of "distributed" force 
capabilities that will serve as the Army's baptism by fire. The ultimate goal is to save 
soldiers lives while simultaneously protecting democracy. 
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in. APPLICABLE ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES AND 
ACCELERATED ACQUISITION EMPLOYED 
This chapter is broken in two distinct parts. In the first part, I will describe 
acquisition reform from a program manager's perspective. I will attempt to portray the 
latest known evidences of what acquisition reform is and how it is applied in the DoD. In 
the second part, I will describe which acquisition reform initiatives that the Army applied 
to the Brigade Combat Team acquisition of its Interim Armored Vehicle program. 
A.        ACQUISITION REFORM BACKGROUND SUMMARY 
In trying to collect a singular document that encompasses acquisition reform, I 
quickly understood that one document simply did not exist. When Dr. Perry (then 
Secretary of Defense) issued his 1994 memo, he not only eliminated most Government 
Spec and Standards but also started the wheels in motion of an effort that today we call 
acquisition reform. Acquisition reform, however, is much more than any one initiative or 
plan of action. Instead, it is a conglomeration of multifaceted processes, tenets, and 
initiatives that have, in some instances, taken on a life of their own. 
I determined that there were two reliable information sources that best define 
acquisition reform. The most comprehensive compilation of acquisition reform is the 
Acquisition Deskbook. Published in Internet download and CD distributed versions, the 
Deskbook contains all the initiatives, tenets, processes, tools, as well as examples of 
successes and failures, that help define acquisition reform. The second source is 
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direction from the Department of Defense, as published in directive memos, on how to 
execute certain aspects of acquisition reform. More recently I learned that the directive 
that Dr. Gansler published has been even further refined and reprioritized. I will present 
Dr. Gansler's reform intent and describe how departmental efforts such as the Army's 
Deskbook guidance fit under his intent. Based on the recent improvements to his 
guidance I will also show how the Army guidance fits under the latest DoD guidance on 
the reform focus areas. 
In Jun 2000 Dr Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics provided a formal reference set that helps define what the DoD as a whole 
must do for reform (Gansler, June 2000). His memo was in response to Congressional 
direction in the form of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. In 
this Act one particular section, Section 912(c), required the Secretary of Defense to 
establish a streamlining plan for acquisition organizations, workforce, and organizations; 
commonly known and reported as 912(c) initiatives. In Dr. Gansler's preface memo, he 
provided the DoD's best response to the Section 912(c) wherein he stated that the DoD is 
actively carrying out acquisition reform and provided substantive evidence of progress. 
He went on to provide an acquisition reform framework in a report titled the "Road 
Ahead" which defines three primary acquisition reform goals (Gansler, "The Road 
Ahead", Jun 2000). They are to field high-quality defense products quickly; support 
them responsively, lower the total ownership cost of defense products, and reduce the 
overhead cost of the acquisition and logistics infrastructure. These goals are supported 
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by a concerted effort within the DoD on six focus areas. Individual initiatives and tenets 
then underpin the six focus areas. The six focus areas include: 
• Reliance on an Integrated Civil-Military Industrial Base 
• Reliance on Price and Schedule in Design Development 
• Logistics on Demand; Agile and Reliable Logistic Processes 
• Reduced DoD Acquisition Infrastructure Overhead 
• Enhanced DoD Workforce Training 
• Continuous Improvement with Systematic Change Management 
The Army has also worked towards defining acquisition reform for its workforce 
and recently provided a representative list of 20 Streamlining Tips that also included 
"Real Life Examples" of successes (Acquisition Deskbook, Version 3.4, Winter 2001). 
Although not a comprehensive list, it included: 
Eliminating Specs and Standards 
Electronic Commerce (E-commerce) 
Single Process Initiatives 
Multi-year Agreements 
Streamlining Contract Requirements 
Commercial Test Equipment 
Single Acquisition Management Plan 
Procuring Commercial Items 
Commercializing Contract Requirements 
Alpha Contracting 
Partnering 
New Uniform Contract Format 
Power-down Authority 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CATV) 
In addition to these, two relatively new initiatives have emerged: 
Evolutionary Acquisition 
Time-Phased System Development 
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In the remainder of this part of the chapter, I will discuss each of the DoD's six 
focus areas and which of the underlying Army initiatives that support them. I will also 
include several other applicable initiatives. 
1. Integrated Civil-Military Industrial Base 
This focus area is supported by the Army's top 20 Streamlining Tips such as 
eliminating specs and standards, procuring commercial items, single process initiatives, 
commercializing contract requirements, streamlining contract requirements, single 
acquisition management plan (SAMP), alpha contracting, partnering, new uniform 
contract format, power-down authority (empowerment), Cost as an Independent Variable 
(CATV), and the use of commercial test equipment. 
Few Government employees will argue that the elimination of Government 
specific "how to" specifications was a bad thing. The Army provided five prime 
examples of cost and schedule saving provided through elimination of "how to" specs 
that ranged from a 1/3 reduction in the cost of denim overalls to 1/3 savings in the cost of 
the Abram's Eyesafe Laser Rangefinder. Contractors now are able to apply initiative and 
innovation that might not have been allowed under previous Government specs and 
standards. Often the result is the ability of a contractor to deliver a commercial product 
that meets Government performance standards that comes off-the-shelf at a severely 
reduced cost and schedule. 
Single process initiatives (SPI) are contributing similar savings to the 
Government. A classic example of SPI was the Army's correction of combat vehicle 
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heater requirements. In 1991, TACOM set out to fix the combat vehicle heater used in 
the Bradley and Abrams as well as numerous other combat vehicles. The primary heater 
supplier at the time had three prime contracts with the Government or its prime 
contractors. One contract was with TACOM for spare heaters for the field, one was with 
General Dynamics supporting Abrams production, and one was with FMC (now United 
Defense) supporting Bradley production. Each contract had similar but not equal 
requirements. The potential existed, and actual came to fruition, that during lot sample 
testing, a failure as defined by one contract, could meet another. The TACOM spares 
requirements were the least stringent behind the Bradley contract, which was slightly less 
stringent than the Abrams contract. Therefore, a lot sample failure might cause a lot to be 
rejected for the Abrams contract and still meet the Bradley or TACOM contract. This 
occurred numerous times until the Government coordinated with its vehicle primes to 
create one process for lot sample testing. After SPI, the manufacturer had one set of 
performance standards and one set of lot sampling standards. The requirements were 
more consistent and the Army got a better product. 
Various contracting methods have been employed with varying positive effects on 
Government contracts: SAMP, Alpha Contracting, Model Contracts and the new uniform 
contract format. Improvements include tailoring and minimizing requirements and 
specified data needs wherein all the required program management documents are rolled 
into a single document. An example: the data item description for the Heavy Assault 
Bridge took less than 65 pages; such as the reduced PLT was reduced from 22 to four 
months on the Improved Recovery Vehicle by minimizing and tailoring requirements. 
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In addition such initiatives as Modeling and Simulation (M&S) in the acquisition 
life cycle, or Simulation-Based Acquisition, provide parallels to commercial practices. 
Only in departmental (or uniformed Services') application of reform initiatives can you 
find the words that depict that "thou shalt" simulate and model for effective acquisitions. 
The DoD has known for years that risk management, systems engineering, cost analysis, 
manufacturing processes, component and system design, survivability testing and human 
factors integration all benefit directly from M&S. The classic educational example is the 
application of Simulation Based (Sim-Based) acquisition of the Boeing 777 program. 
Engineers, managers, scientists, and financial wizards all concepted, created, modified, 
designed, and sold the Boeing 777 using M&S to reduce design cycle time, enhance 
decision briefings, institute real-time data interchange, and include test and evaluation. 
2. Including Price and Schedule Trade-off in Design Development 
This focus area is supported by the Army's top 20 Streamlining Tips such as 
incremental or time-phased system development, evolutionary acquisition, increased 
technical maturity before moving through acquisition milestones, 
The key to this list is a relatively new acquisition technique commonly known as 
evolutionary acquisition, which allows for technical maturity through modularity and 
future upgrade. This is especially applicable to sophisticated communication equipment 
that can be purchased as commercial items with open system architectures that allow for 
block improvement or preplanned product improvement when technology moves to the 
next level of capabilities. 
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Technical maturity is also a key facet of the new DoD 5000 series published 
(DoD 5000.2, October 2000). Technical maturity is a key enabler and milestone decision 
support item. In other words, a key exit criterion is whether the technology the system 
needs truly exists. It need not be a negative as technology maturity may provide program 
entry into the far right of the acquisition cycle based on proven technological maturity 
3. Logistics on Demand; Agile and Reliable 
The Army's top 20 Streamlining Tips such as E-commerce support this focus 
area, performance based logistics specifications and standards, integrated supply chains, 
multi-year agreements. Commonly referred to as the Revolution in Military Logistics in 
the Army, a key facet of acquisition reform is to invest as much in the improved logistics 
support of the system, or end item, as the Government invests in the system itself. 
Support items will obviously benefit from performance based specs and standards, but 
they unfortunately are the least considered. There is a general swing in the DoD today to 
further consider logistics or support items up front in the system design and development 
process. A new facet of the DoD 5000 improvements requires that total life cycle costs 
be calculated and provided as part of the system development (DoD 5000, Oct 2000). 
From a programmatic standpoint, this is very difficult to refine to any disceraable level. 
Multi-year agreements or contracts as well as supply chain management are key 
cost savings enablers for the commercial market place (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1991) but 
which have proven elusive in the Government for various reasons. The DoD current 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics recently reported 
to the Senate Armed Service Committee that multiyear contracts will, "remain an 
39 
effective tool only if the parties to the multiyear contract live up to the long-term 
commitment they made." Of course, the volatility of the Defense Department budgets 
and Congressional intervention make long-term commitments difficult to execute and 
retain (Defense Daily, 27 April 2001). 
4. Reduced DoD Acquisition Infrastructure Overhead 
This focus area is supported by the Army's top 20 Streamlining Tips such as 
Streamlined Management, otherwise known as "Reshape," Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC), and best commercial practices. This focus area has little direct impact 
on an individual acquisition action, but affects all procurements based on DoD strategic 
goals and patterns. 
5. Enhanced DoD Workforce Training 
The Army's top 20 Streamlining Tips such as streamlining contract requirements, 
SAMP, alpha contracting, partnering, new uniform contract format, power-down 
authority, Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) and commercial test equipment 
support this focus area. I rely here on the computer adage that emerged simultaneous to 
the first personal computer, Garbage in Garbage out (GIGO). The best initiatives will not 
execute themselves, let alone effectively. I will touch more on this in the next chapter, 
but suffice to say that key acquisition personnel must receive requisite training in order to 
apply acquisition reform. The efforts of the PM for Brigade Combat Team would not 
have been accomplished if the workforce did not know how to apply acquisition reform 
initiatives. The DoD has established training goals of 80 hours per employee for 
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acquisition training and is investigating changes and modifications to the existing 
program management courses available for the better-than-average acquisition employee. 
6. Continuous Improvement with Systematic Change Management 
The Army's top 20 Streamlining Tips such as partnering, best commercial 
practices and continuous improvement support this focus area. Similarly described 
above, the tools are the same, but the application here has a different intent. The DoD 
intends to, "rapidly implement the business process changes required to better support the 
warfighter." Essentially, this encapsulates the entire reform process into change 
management. That is, the DoD and the Army must continue to develop guidance and 
leadership that not only waves the reform flag, but encompasses reform in its leaders 
through education, supported empowerment, true accountability, trust, and partnering. 
7. Common Terms 
Other nebulous concepts are also closely associated with acquisition reform even 
though they are not exclusive to acquisition reform. Terms like Best Value and Best 
Practices are common in the program management community. They are commonly 
known and understood, but their application is not easily verifiable or quantifiable. 
Effectively applied, best value can result in a realistic trade-off between performance, 
schedule, and cost. Applied ineffectively, the result is contractor selection based on low 
price determination regardless of the additional performance and/or schedule benefits. 
Effective discussions also appear under the common terms heading. The 
Government has been performing discussions with their offerors for eons. Discussions 
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take on a new level of meaning with respect to acquisition reform. Tied to partnering, 
teaming, E-commerce, electronic data interchange, Draft RFPs, Industry Days, Advanced 
Planning to Industry, Model Contracting and Alpha Contracting, discussions, and their 
timely application, become the cornerstone of acquisition reform. The key point is that 
there must be effective communication between the contractor (or potential contractor) 
and the Government. This is in fact imperative for acquisition reform and underpins the 
entire process. Communication and mutual understanding of system requirements, 
capabilities, schedule, items that are or are not Government Furnished Equipment, test 
requirements, funding limitations, socio-political limitations or enhancements and day-to- 
day operations are critical to accomplishing improvements in the Acquisition process. 
8. Communication, Performance Based Requirements and Teaming are 
Keys to Execution 
Advanced planning and acquisition strategies that only include the Government 
won't achieve the facets of acquisition reform. Communication and information 
exchanges are therefore imperative to achieve successful program execution. Involving 
the contractor early in the procurement process has been proven to be beneficial to both 
the Government and for the contractor through better contract execution from the start 
and through more effective proposals based on better knowledge of what is being 
procured. This was evidenced in the lessons learned from the Government's procurement 
of the Near Term Digital Radio. Through the use of iterative Draft Performance Based 
Specifications, the contractors had, "a better understanding of the requirement and were 
able to respond with solutions that in some cases they were already working on as part of 
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the ER&D programs (Acquisition Deskbook, Acquisition Success Story Number 8, 
Version 3.4, Winter 2001.) 
Communication and performance based specifications were further enjoined by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in a memo he 
presented to the acquisition community. In it he described performance-based 
requirements and allowances for commercial best practices as key to continued 
successful acquisition reform. In this instance he also wrapped communication into the 
Integrated Product Team (FT) process. Published January 5,2001 it interestingly was 
published in the same quarter as a recent GAO report describing the DoD's use of IPTs to 
more effectively execute military acquisition programs. The GAO published their 
opinion in Draft form Mar 12th and the DoD commented on Apr 9th. The GAO pointed 
out that, "Integrated Product Teams work." (GAO-01-510 Best Practices, April 2001). 
The DoD agreed that they could do a better job of implementing IPTs that have "day-to- 
day responsibility for developing and delivering a product such as a weapon system." 
(GAO-01-510, April 2001). Its clear that communication, performance based 
specifications and teaming through IPTs has a significant effect on success of a major 
defense acquisition. 
9. Applicable Diversity 
To better show the interactions of the DoD acquisition reform focus areas and the 
Army Streamlining tips, I generated a graphic illustration at Figure 7 below. Acquisition 
reform is not a silver bullet to magically make every program schedule move to the 
"left", free up major increments of operating budget, and allow for additional technology 
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insertion. Further, there is not one singular acquisition reform initiative that will solve all 
programmatic problems. Referring to Figure 7, however, one can see that the methods to 
achieve acquisition reform (DoD focus areas) are just as diverse as the initiatives (Army 
Streamlining Tips). 
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Integrated Civil-military *«_q 
Industrial Base 
-
»-———— Time Phased System Development 
^^2=="Evolutionary Acquisition 
^__-,a           Eliminating Specs and Standards 
Reliance on Rice and 
Schedule in Design   —«=™^ 
Development 
^a^     /WH 
_V                                        *-~1        .             •       .-.       rr~ S 
YM^"-    - - Single Process Initiatives 
yjHr    ™ "~" Multi-year Agieements 
Logistics on Demand; 
Agile and Reliable Logistic mm 
Processes 
\V|EU>"   —' Streamlining Contract Requirements 
JffftX     "— Commercial Test Equipment 
1UU\ ^s-ar- Single Acquisition Management Plan 
Reduced DoD Acquisition 
Infrastructure Overhead 
II ll\            Procuring Commercial Items 
II11 „v,—— Commercializing Contract 
ill I              Requirements 
Enhanced DoD Workforce -_< 
Training 
jrrV  Alpha Contracting 
ll-V--—    Partnering 




~ Modeling and Simulation 
Figure 7 - DoD Acquisiton Reform Focus Areas Connected to Army Streamlining Tips 
(After Ref. DoD Acquisition Deskbook, Version 3.4, Winter 01) 
B.        ACQUISITION REFORM APPLIED TO THE IBCT 
I will now look at the acquisition reform initiatives that were employed in the 
solicitation of the Brigade Combat Team. The PM and PCO first publicly announced 
Army's intent for an Interim Brigade Combat Team solicitation through a synopsis in 
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Commerce Business Daily (CBD) on 3 November 1999. According to the PCO, the 
CBD announcement put industry and interested parties on notice and it specified for them 
the acquisition preliminary milestones for the IBCT program (Bousquet, Dec 99). The 
PM and the PCO, went to great lengths to ensure the aggressive schedule they developed 
(Table 2), still met the DoD and FAR requirements for fair and open competition. As 
equally affecting and almost certainly more constraining, statute and law must 
simultaneously be met while executing the program with acquisition reform. 
Date Task 
Jan 00 Platform Performance Demo 
31 Jan 00 White Papers Due 
29 Feb 00 Issue Solicitation 
30 Apr 00 Receive Proposals 
30 Jun 00 Award Contract(s) 
31 Mar 01 First Unit Equipped 
Table 2 - Significant Acquisition Dates (Source: Researcher) 
Although very brief, the announcement had four aspects that included the intent to 
perform a market survey, notification of the Army's intent to hold an Advance Planning 
Brief to Industry, the inclusion of a White Paper submittal request, and finally the Army's 
intent to Competitively procure the Interim Armored Vehicle. 
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1. Market Survey 
As a key facet of acquisition reform, PM and PCO first announced that they were 
conducting a market survey,".. .to determine the potential availability of a family (or 
families) of systems to equip a new brigade organization for full spectrum operations" 
(CBD Announcement, 3 November 1999). Based on the history of medium force 
procurements, this latest medium force concept was not new. Taken in conjunction with 
the CSA's vision statement in October 1999, the defense community quickly took notice. 
Not a traditional market survey in the sense that the Government usually asks 
what is available, this time the Army asked what could the defense industry bring to a 
demonstration event to show what they had capable off-the-shelf. The key was the 
capability to deliver a family of vehicles that could perform within the O&O concept that 
did not require extensive development. Therefore, as part of the market survey, they 
included details to allow for potential offerors to demonstrate their wares. Commonly 
now called the Platform Performance Demonstration or PPD, the PMO designed it to, 
".. .assist the Army in refinement of the organizational and operational concept", and they 
further clarified by adding to this statement that the PPD, ".. .is not part of an Army 
acquisition procurement action" (CBD Announcement, November 1999). This is rather 
important, as Mr. Bousquet, the PCO, emphasized, "The PPD is not graded." The PMO 
made a very open effort to avoid any confusion on this point. The PM used the PPD only 
to refine the program goals and objectives in conjunction with our acquisition planning. 
Early on, some competitors perceived that the PPD was going to be an acquisition "run- 
off." The PM struggled from the beginning of the process to ensure that this perception 
did not become a stigma to the program. Through well-publicized efforts the PM was 
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able to forego the misnomer of "run-off' and ensure the PPD was a demonstration of the 
market's ability to achieve the drafted performance requirements and not a tool to 
exclude a contractor from source selection. 
An important point to make here is that the BCT program was only four months 
old when the PPD was to be carried out. In lieu of the market survey to question what 
"could be" available, the Army wanted to know what "was" available. This is significant 
because at the same time, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was still 
refining the requirements documents that would be used to baseline the entire capabilities 
of the BCT. As was identified in the Armor Center memo to industry written to the 
industry interested parties, the bottom line for the demonstration was to gain observations 
that, "will assist the Army in refining the O&O concept and, later, requirements 
documentation" (Bell, MG, PPD memo, 18 November 1999). The memo went on to say 
that the Army would provide an assessment of each platform provided and that the 
assessment would include six force effectiveness areas that were identified in the CBD 
announcement: deployability, sustainability, Manpower and Personnel Integration 
(MANPPJNT), lethality, survivability, and battle field mobility. 
The Army would not perform an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) that would 
normally drive the requirements process into a materiel solution. Instead, they 
recognized that a definitive warfighting shortcoming existed that only a materiel solution 
could resolve. This fact was documented in a very high level "Blue Book" analysis that 
resulted in the publication of the BCT required Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). 
47 
Generated at the COL and GO level, the Blue Book analysis was not provided to the 
working level and, as is the normal case, has not since been made publicly available. 
In a first draft and subsequent follow-on memo describing OSD PA&E's 
agreement with the Army's efforts to envelope the alternatives, they stated that they 
understood why the Army had not performed a formal AoA and how the Army had 
arrived at its conclusions. Where they contended that Army's work was with regard to 
the development of the KPPs. Although they agreed that the program was, "top-down 
driven and the analytical work is struggling to catch up." They pointed out that the Army 
must strive to continue to evolve their analysis to support the Blue Book findings and 
offered considerable opinion on how to refine the KPPs that were generated. The memo 
provided detailed account of the KPP rationale and asked pointed questions to the Army 
with regard to supporting the studies findings. Since the KPPs evolved from the Blue 
Book analysis, the CBTDEV and MATDEV communities accepted them as being valid. 
The PM office worked with its industry partners to ensure that the KPPs were achievable 
within the acquisition timeframe (Q&As, white Papers, and etc.). I will discuss this 
aspect more in the next chapter. 
In keeping with acquisition reform (DoD 5000, October 2000), the number of 
KPPs were limited. There were five total: C-130 air transportability, interoperability 
(C4ISR), and capability to carry a nine man infantry squad, with two specific to the 
MGS, the capability to defeat a standard infantry bunker and create an opening in double 
reinforced concrete walls. Although not KPPs, the Blue Book analysis also addressed 
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logistics and supportability requirements, survivability, lethality, Reliability, Availability, 
and Maintainability (RAM), and mobility considerations that also were interwoven into 
the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). I will address the OSD PA&E memo in 
greater detail in the next chapter. 
The Program Analysis and Evaluation office at OSD commented prior to the 
BCT's Army Material Command and TRADOC partnering conference in April 2000 on 
the validity of the Blue Book Analysis. Their comments included a "recognition" of the 
level of Army interest, requested additional information on numerous aspects of the 
Army plans, but ended with a very supportive statement that, "There is a high level of 
support for the Army vision." OSD went to great lengths to ensure that an executable 
program was funded in the President's Budget." Through intensive communication with 
OSD PA&E, the Army was able to move forward in the procurement process. 
2. Advance Planning Brief to Industry (APBI) 
The second item that was called out in the CBD announcement identified the 
PMO's intent to hold an APBI. The PMO identified that at the APBI, the Army would 
provide details of the program, with potential desired capabilities. This briefing, as an 
acquisition planning tool, provided for an open forum dialogue on where the program 
could go, how it could be designed, and it allowed for the offerors to begin preparing 
their own strategies. Since the early 1990s, the Army has used the APBI technique to 
announce all the contracts that TACOM planned to procure for a coming fiscal year. The 
APBI agenda covered such items as Class DC spares for every major system that TACOM 
manages and it includes reminders on major system procurements that have already been 
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announced. TACOM Acquisition Center personnel make every effort to educate industry 
on upcoming solicitations (IFBs and RFPs) in order to ensure competition. For the BCT, 
this is an additional procedure that ensures two things for us. First that prudent defense 
businesses are aware of our intent to buy a system, titled the BCT. Second that those 
same prudent businesses can now be our collective partners in developing a 
comprehensive acquisition and as well as help the PM office build a comprehensive new 
organization. The APBI was held on 1 Dec 99. 
Under this same category, informing our industry partners, the PM held a 
subsequent "industry day" when it announced and held its pre-proposal conference (PM- 
BCT, Pre-Proposal Conference, 7 April 2000). Intended to be a kick-off for the formal 
RFP release, the timing for that release became too tight and therefore the PM announced 
that they would provide RFP insights. The PM's acquisition team did come through 
when they released the formal RFP the night before the pre-proposal conference. 
Briefings included updates and insights into the RFP and the performance specification as 
well as contract structure, Sections L and M as well as Table LM, Logistics, GFE, Bid 
Sample Evaluation requirements, and security considerations for the program. 
3. White Papers 
In concert with the APBI and the partnering needed to succeed, the CBD 
announcement included a third aspect that was critical to the accelerated acquisition, the 
requirement for White Papers. Fundamentally, a call for early assistance from the 
defense industry, this action was truly a partnering agreement with all involved. The PM 
asked the defense industry to tell them the most favorable, flexible, affordable, realistic 
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approaches to carrying out the overarching plan of fielding a new system. Specifically, 
the announcement asked industry to identify: 
...acquisition strategy, program requirements, system of systems integration, 
production capability, product assurance, MANPRINT, C4ISR connectivity, training, 
logistics concepts, embedded diagnostics, technical insertion, teaming, and opportunities 
for public/private partnering (PM-BCT, 3 November 1999). 
The announcement formally asked for the offerors to identify, in a more formal 
sense, partnering opportunities. In essence then, the Army asked the offerors to affirm 
their participation by laying the ground rules that are important to them, before the Army 
completed its own decision on the ground rules. The Army worked on its own strategies 
based on acquisition and program management experiences, but having each offerer 
assess the program from their standpoint, along with the market survey and APBI, 
allowed the Army to create the ultimate compromise, that would make it difficult to 
protest. The Army sought a coordinated position from which no offeror could later 
protest that their ideas had not been considered. 
The thought process during acquisition planning included a hypothetical "what-if' 
drill to help the PM avoid a highly likely protest. The thought process allowed them to 
war game the outcomes. If for instance, the Army chooses vehicle X, which has A-M 
capabilities, and if Vehicle Y has those same capabilities but to a lesser extent, then 
Contractor Y has little grounds to successfully protest. If vehicle Z has the A-M 
capabilities also, to a greater extent, as capabilities N and O, and also costs more, the best 
value process may lay grounds for protest. The beauty of the process is that the 
capabilities the Army desires, the type of contract the PM chooses, and the technical 
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approach chosen may all be compromises from the collective white papers. The true 
difficulty from a source selection standpoint would be choosing how to evaluate the 
various alternative capabilities. What they had was a sliding scale depending on what 
was generated as requirements and contract deliverables as compared to the actual 
vehicle designs that the PM saw. Mr. Bousquet, the PCO, summed it up at the time in 
this way, "through the PPD and white papers, our offerors will see and experience with 
us." "Together," he went on to say, "we will build a solicitation, which identifies 
objectives versus [the Army] writing a Statement of Work that contains solutions." 
He was right in that the PM received four very intuitive offers representing 
technologies that at times were at opposite ends of the spectrum with regard to individual 
requirements. Each collectively met the required capabilities with varying degrees of 
success and allowed for the Source Selection Authority to select a best value vehicle 
system solution.   As a fall-out of performance specs and standards, an individual 
requirement may lose its identity when a trade-off occurs. Losing offerors tend to pick 
out their good attributes and emphasize them back to the Government. They ask why 
their vehicle wasn't selected when for the one or two particular requirements they were 
rated superior; were these not significant enough to earn them a contract? The 
Government is then put in a defensive posture and has to convince others that they did the 
right thing. I will cover more on this in Chapter IV when I discuss the award protest and 
its effect on execution of the program. 
52 
4. Full and Open Competition 
The final, or fourth, aspect that the CBD announcement provided was a notice of 
intent to competitively acquire that BCT systems. This point is required and is important, 
but pales in comparison to the other tasks identified. The latest changes to DoD 5000.2 
encourage market research in addition to the use of commercial products in order to 
increase competition (Hawthorn, May 2001). In the end, competition is inherent to the 
program through the other three aspects. 
The PMO has made great strides in this program to ensure fair and open 
competition. Most are minor extensions of the efforts they would take to protect the 
integrity of any other acquisition program. Early on, several prominent defense 
manufacturers expressed concerns that the Army has already made up its mind on with 
regard to which vehicle it wanted since the only successful lease executed was for the 
Canadian LAV III and that it was just going through the motions (Seffers, December 
1999). There was a perception that the PMO was only going to lease one vehicle type 
and therefore had already settled on the GM LAV III for the IBCT. This was never the 
intent of the PM and they were able to show their intent for diversity through the lease of 
several additional vehicle platforms including the Italian-made Centauro. Originally 
intended as a prototype for the howitzer variant from the original ORD, the Centauro has 
been a participant since the summer of 2000. 
As described in Chapter n, the use of leased vehicles supplants a drawn out 
comparative analysis but more importantly adds definition and validation to the O&O for 
the IBCT. Through the use of the GM LAV III and the Centauro, the PM can borrow 
53 
tactical and procedural baselines from the Canadians and potentially the Marine Corps. 
The PM is entertaining the idea of extending the leases for additional time beyond the 
original contract in order to focus on the fielding and NET processes as well as add 
additional familiarization assets to the Brigades at Ft. Lewis while they are receiving their 
IAVs; there will be an expanded description of this in Chapter IV. 
Mr. Bousquet, the PCO, characterized the vehicle leases in general as smart 
business from the standpoint of competition, as well as upholding the fairness issue. The 
more systems the PM puts into soldiers' hands, the better tactics and procedures that will 
be built. The more systems that the Army experiments with, the more they will learn 
what works and what does not, thus resulting in a better acquisition. The PCO further 
stressed that the emphasis to improve the requirements was from the white papers even 
though most perceive it was the PPD and the vehicle leases. Just like the "bird in hand" 
proverb, the systems demonstrated performance during the PPD and trained on through 
the lease programs would carry much weight especially in the media. The Army, more 
particularly the PM, will have a difficult time juggling public and congressional 
perceptions that are formed during the PPD. The PPD is the showcase, as has been 
discussed; the white papers will be like a ''warranty". As a final note, an offerer need not 
participate in the PPD in order to submit a white paper. The PM, therefore, needed to de- 
emphasize the PPD through effectively employing the collective knowledge gained 
through the white paper process. 
54 
5. Fast Track 
To add some positive light to a seemingly muddy process, the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Office (BMDO) has successfully used a similar, albeit smaller scale, version of 
the partnering process (Reuter, July 1999) described above. Their term for this process of 
accelerated and partnered acquisition planning is "Fast Track." They have had their 
contractors helping them design their acquisition programs since 1997. They pointed out 
strikingly similar practices such as, early identification of the requirement, limiting 
proposal data submissions to only those that are significant and best value, and 
accelerated acquisition through concurrent actions. They claimed significant time and 
expended resource reductions through this process that also resulted in fewer disputes. 
One key item they pointed out in their process was discussions before solicitation. 
The absolute must in this matter is that the discussions are not part of the acquisition and 
they are not graded, or evaluated. The BMDO identified up front to their offerors that 
any question or comment on the RFP would be provided to all offerors and the 
originating offeror would then be given the chance to rescind the question before the 
Government responded. The article cautioned, and Mr. Bousquet agreed in principle, that 
early discussions in the non-binding sense could be effective in avoiding confusion and 
ambiguities in the solicitation. The article went on to say that they considered the 
discussions to be presolicitation activity covered under FAR 15.201. From a common 
sense point, this is what the acquisition community does with Draft RFPs and 
presolicitation conferences, to promote an understanding of the requirements that avoids 
confusion. Perhaps this should called open dialogue rather than discussions. 
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6. Draft RFPs 
The PM office employed three iterations of the Draft RFP process. The first Draft 
RFP was released in December of 1999 (RFP, 1st Draft, 30 Dec 1999). Quickly put 
together by a handful of TACOM engineers, contracting and logistics experts, it did not 
represent much more that the best information available on the brigade combat team's 
intended mission requirements. A detailed performance specification and Statement of 
Work (SOW) did not exist. The original acquisition strategy had included the use of a 
Statement of Objectives (SOO). The PM had intended to allow for the most flexibility 
possible for offerors but realized that reduced time of the solicitation would be better 
suited to the structure and detail provided in a SOW and performance specification, thus 
laying the groundwork for the offerors to tailor as they saw fit. TACOM took questions 
and provided answers (Q&As) but, as they had instructed the offerors up front, they 
provided answers back to the community in an open forum thus providing the most 
effective use of time and resources to eliminate redundancies. Numerous Q&As to the 
first Draft RFP were quickly posted to a public access ".mil" web site as part of 
TACOM's Acquisition Center. The 2nd Draft RFP took into account the questions asked 
and the answers given that improved the RFP. 
The second Draft RFP followed soon after the Christmas holidays and included a 
nearly complete replacement of the original SOW and performance specification. The 
Final RFP release occurred on April 6th, 2000. Published on the eve of the final 
contractor and Government interchange meeting at TACOM. 
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7. Source Selection 
This brings us to the all-important Source Selection process, which supported 
everything that had been done to this point. Although the actions of the SSEB, SSAC, 
and SSA are outside the scope of this thesis, the source selection methodology has some 
aspects of acquisition reform and is worthy of mention here. Originally intended to be an 
accelerated process, the Formal RFP was released on 6 Apr 2000 and proposals were due 
on 6 Jun 2000. The SSEB was to meet and make their decision by the end of Aug 2000. 
Due to unforeseen complexities and necessary adjustments to the schedule, the formal 
SSEB evaluations were provided to the Source Selection Authority in Oct 2000. His 
decision and announcement was made on 16 Nov 2000. This was a mere 14 months 
since the Chief of Staff had made his formal program announcement. 
Made up of subject matter experts (SMEs) from DoD, Army, Air Force and 
Contractors, representing multiple functional areas, the SSEB contained more than 150 
personnel full and part-time (PM-BCT brief, April 2001). What they evaluated were four 
offeror's proposals that represented from one to three iterations for each proposal. The 
solicitation was broken into two potential parts that allowed for up to three methods of 
award to any one offerer. The solicitation provided for awards for the entire IAV family, 
the ICV and its configurations, and the MGS standalone. This was intended to maximize 
the ability of an offerer to propose against portions of the entire program and thus 
maximize competition and reduce risk to the Army. Other aspects of the solicitation 
counter-balanced the split award option to some extent by encouraging maximum 
commonality between the ICV and the MGS, but would not eliminate a competitor. 
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a) Bid samples 
One significant event that supported the accelerated schedule was the Bid 
Sample Evaluation event. Prototype bid sample vehicles were delivered to the Aberdeen 
Test Center (ATC) simultaneously with the submittal of formal proposals. Designated to 
be production representative, allowances were made for the speed of the proposal 
delivery for hand built vehicles. The bid sample vehicles were ICVs since they are the 
mainstays of the IAV program. Each offerer provided two bid sample ICV vehicles that 
were then designated by ATC as Performance and RAM. The performance vehicles were 
taken through representative performance specification tests of mobility, C-130 test 
loading, and fuel economy tests while the RAM vehicles were run through as many RAM 
miles as possible in their brief stay at ATC. 
The reason for the Bid Sample Event was not to replace the need for an 
offeror's proposal but was designed to allow them to prove out some of their capabilities 
through physical demonstration and thereby reduce the program risks. The SSEB did not 
use bid sample data, in and of themselves, to perform evaluation or comparison of an 
offeror's proposal. Instead, the data collected were used to validate proposed capabilities 
or to assist in establishing risks to capabilities proposed. The new DoD 5000 requires a 
"fly before you buy" demonstrated technology decision before entering into LRIP at 
Milestone C (DoD 5000.2, Oct 2000). The Bid Sample evaluation performed this 
function quite well, as I will describe on more detail in the next chapter. 
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b) Items for Discussion and Formal Discussions 
In conjunction with formal SSEB procedures, TACOM performed both 
written and oral discussions with the offerors. Above, I mentioned that the PCO was 
cautious that early in the process the Government would partner and involve the offerors 
to help define and refine system requirements. In the SSEB process, discussions are 
intended to ensure both that the offerer understand the Army's requirements, given a 
certain aspect of their proposal and that the Army was interpreting the offerer's proposal 
correctly. This is a very effective tool for avoiding confusion and is not necessarily a 
reform tool, but goes along with the concept of open dialogue and communication that 
lowers the risk of problems throughout the procurement process. In all, there were more 
than 400 IFDs submitted in multiple iterations at times and the offerors were included in 
face-to-face as well as telephonic discussions numerous times during the SSEB process. 
All the IFDs were transmitted via e-mail attachments and responses were 
received likewise. Few exceptions existed except where response files were too large to 
transmit over the Internet; in those situations, fax and floppy disks were used instead. 
Solicitation changes that occurred during the source selection process were also posted on 
the TACOM procurement web page as described above. A rolling change policy was 
used and formal responses to IFDs were considered proposal revisions. This policy was 
employed throughout. TACOM did not require the offerors to resubmit in response to the 
Final Proposal Revision notification except for those aspects of their proposals that 
needed revising. Although not paperless, the LAV SSEB made every attempt to eliminate 
paper waste. 
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8. Contract Award 
Ultimately, the source selection was based on the submitted proposals and 
revisions and not on lease vehicle data, PPD, white paper submittals, nor bid sample 
evaluation. Each of these efforts contributed to the refinement of the Government's 
requirements and the Contractors' proposals but was not directly reflected in the 
evaluation of the proposals unless a specific item was identified as supporting data in a 
contractor's proposal. The ensuing congressional notification pointed out that there were 
109 proposals solicited including sub-contractors and 20 proposals received. 
(Congressional notification, IAV Award, 16 Nov 2000) 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
ACQUISITION REFORM AND ACCELERATED ACQUISITION 
This chapter is intended to deliver a qualitative assessment of acquisition reform 
and accelerated acquisition as applied to the procurement of the Interim Brigade Combat 
Team (EBCT). Where available data exist, I will also provide quantitative assessment. 
Due to this procurement's unique characteristics, there are few comparable programs that 
ever moved as fast or were as large to provide relative quantitative comparisons. 
Therefore, I will analyze the facets of acquisition reform that were employed and provide 
qualitative assessments with indirect comparison. When available, I will also provide 
quantitative assessments with direct comparison to similar programs. To provide 
continuity, I will analyze the acquisition reform facets in the same order as Part B of 
Chapter III. 
To further facilitate the comparisons, I will break the chapter into two parts. The 
first part will entail the time frame from program initiation in October 1999 through the 
release of the formal RFP in April 2000. The second part will look at the source selection 
process from the receipt of proposals through contract award in November 2000. This 
ignores the 60-day period from the release of the RFP to proposal receipt. 
At the end of this chapter, I will provide a summary of the protest filed against the 
contact award and the GAO response. I feel that this is worth discussing in the context of 
the effects of acquisition reform on the process of the award determination. Due to the 
limited amount of publicly available data, this discussion will be short. 
61 
A.       REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION 
This area focuses on the program management acquisition reform activities that 
were employed from program initiation through to the release of the formal RFP. I 
patterned the respective Chapter III sections on the 9 November 1999 Commerce 
Business Daily announcement that contained four parts, Market Survey, Advance 
Planning Brief to Industry, White Papers, and the intent to use Full and Open 
Competition for the program. I will use this format again but will add additional 
acquisition reform results that came out of the PM's efforts. As an audit trail, most of the 
initiatives that the PM employed stem from six of the Army Streamlining Tips that I 
presented in Chapter El Part A. The connection is through the Integrated Civil-military 
Industrial Base as supported by good communication, performance based requirements, 
and teaming. The six acquisition reform initiatives most effectively employed by the PM 
office were: 
• Streamlining Contract Requirements 
• Procuring commercial items 
• Partnering 
• Cost as an Independent Variable 
• Eliminating Specs and Standards 
• Electronic Commerce 
1. Market Survey 
A significant contributor to expediting the process and refining the requirements 
for the BCT came from data collected leading up to and through the Platform 
Performance Demonstration (PPD), which was conducted in January 2000. The call for 
offerers to attend and demonstrate their vehicles at the PPD came from the CBD 
announcement. The key restraint came from the time frames identified in that 
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announcement. The intent to deliver a vehicle and participate had to be provided by 13 
November 1999 with the vehicles to be delivered by 13 December 1999. This is fully in 
line with the pace established for the program and falls within the intent, specified in 
Section M of the RFP, to purchase systems that did not need, "extended 
variant/configuration development programs." Extended development was defined as 
efforts requiring, "approximately 24 months or longer of development.. .to complete 
[SDD]" (RFP DAAE07-00-R-M032, 6 April 2000). Asking for representative systems 
and not receiving a response from industry would not have been fatal to the acquisition, 
but certainly would have slowed the pace. Companies from the military industry came 
through and proved that they were capable of delivering medium weight systems as they 
had been advertising. 
There were 35 systems that were delivered and demonstrated at the PPD at Ft. 
Knox, Kentucky. Referring back to Figure 3 in Chapter II, the Army's literature style 
market survey as completed for the Strike Force project in 1998 quite accurately 
predicted the type of vehicles that would be delivered to the PPD. In fact, five vehicles 
from four manufacturers were identified as candidates for the Strike Force effort and 
were eventually offered as candidates for the IAV program in the 17 proposals received. 
Included were the M8 AGS and the Ml 13A3 from UDLP, the Hagglunds CV 9030, the 
AV Technology Pandur (offered by GDLS), and the LAV III from GM of Canada. The 
Ml 13A3 was superceded by UDLP's MTVL, which is essentially a stretched version of 
the previous. The Hagglunds offer for the IAV contract was deemed unacceptable by the 
SSEB. 
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I must include a clarifier about the PPD as there are still many misperceptions. 
The demonstration was not part of the Army's procurement action for the IAV according 
to all documents presented to the media, the offerers, and all Army briefings (as well as 
anything else having to do with the PPD). Army Public Affairs literature provided to the 
offerers established the following two points (TRADOCIBCT Handout, 1999). First, the 
purpose of the Ft. Knox demonstration was to assist the Army in the refinement of its 
O&O concepts for the Brigade Combat Team and to refine the ORD for the IAV. 
Second, the Army's evaluation of industry equipment participating in the Ft. Knox 
demonstration would be disclosed only to the firm whose product was evaluated and 
would not otherwise be publicly disclosed. 
The PPD had two primary parts that occurred on both ends of the Christmas 
holiday, 1999. Part I lasted from 13-20 December 1999. In this part, the Mounted 
Maneuver Battle Lab at Ft. Knox received the vehicles that were to be demonstrated and 
performed a litany of non-operational tests on the vehicles and key driver and operator 
training to support the second part. Non-operational testing included basic dimensional 
data such as combat weight, empty weight, length, width, and height as well as tread 
contact pressure or wheel point and axle loads. Operational assessments were performed 
during this part as well, to include such areas of emphasis as maintainability, 
supportability, and safety. The Army also sent in 70 experts from RDT&E, combat and 
tactical vehicle, ordnance, and ammunition areas to assess vehicle technology insertion 
candidates to support the P3I and block improvements planning for the IBCT. The Army 
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had to accept the capabilities of the vehicles without performing a protracted engineering 
and development effort. They employed time phased system development in that they 
planned block improvements to the systems for technology insertion. This supports the 
Army's desire to deliver a capability today, revise its doctrine and war fighting plans, and 
then reset the needs of objective force. 
Part II was initiated on 3 January 2000 and concluded on 18 January 2000. The 
vehicles were put through operational demonstrations that included mobility, lethality, 
and operability characteristics including on and off road driving, swim, MOUT 
maneuverability and live fire demos. All the data collected was used to support or refute 
the operational characteristics that TRADOC had included in its Draft ORD so that the 
PM office could move forward with the Draft RFP process. Contrary to many media 
views, this was not a "run-off or shoot-off and was not a comparison between wheeled 
and tracked systems to determine how "low" to set the required capabilities in the ORD 
to ensure that wheeled systems can compete (Newman, March 2000). It was carried out 
as an operational market survey expanding on the traditional paper, historical, or 
literature market survey that is normally conducted. Again, the PPD was not a 
competition and all the data collected was provided back to the respective offeror only. 
As an aside and although it was not timely enough to support the accelerated 
acquisition efforts, similar test and evaluation of vehicles is still going on at Ft. Lewis. I 
include this description in order to be perfectly clear that this effort was not part of the 
Army's acquisition process either. The objective at Ft. Lewis is to use alternative 
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vehicle, loaners, and surrogates to develop and further refine tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for a U.S. force to be equipped with the family of IAV vehicles. This testing 
and iterative evaluation could possibly continue through the next several years by 
extending the vehicle lease and borrow arrangements (PM-BCT WS AR, 25 May 2001). 
2. Advanced Planning Brief to Industry (APBI) 
Serving as the initial brief that put industry on notice, this meeting set the pace for 
what the BCT would do for the next 18 months. There were over 400 attendees present 
when the PM office expected only 250 or so offerers. The accommodations were 
standing room only, with people watching from the halls. 
With the recognized need for follow-on face-to-face discussions with industry, 
and with the formal release of the RFP looming, the PM office held their pre-proposal 
conference. One hundred fifty eight people attended with 131 being contractors and 27 
being Government employees. Over 60 companies were represented of which 49 were 
U.S. and 11 Foreign. Not only did the PM staff present an update on the RFP and 
announce that it had been formally released the night before, they also took in more 
questions. Some of the 186 questions identified below, as being as submitted from 
industry and answered by the PM, included questions collected during the pre-proposal 
conference. 
While its difficult to tie quantitative improvements to symposiums and briefings, 
the qualitative benefits included better communication with the offerers, which 
contributed to their better understanding of the RFP and the performance specification. 
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3. White Papers 
The white papers submittal was intended to provide substantive improvements to 
the requirements and the RFP through open format dialogue with industry. While not as 
explosively revealing as the PM had hoped, the white papers provided an important 
output and a significant outcome. The output was an affirmation of the requirements that 
the PM and TRADOC had already generated. That is, that the requirements generation 
effort to date had been "on the mark" with what industry was capable of. The outcome 
was more significant in that a definite acceleration of the requirements generation process 
had occurred especially in the area of market research. Although this is a facet I have 
already analyzed, I have kept the white paper analysis separate for continuity. 
In all, the PM received 199 white papers from industry and Government. There 
were 138 U.S. Industry, 14 U.S Government, 45 Foreign Industry and two Foreign 
Government respondents. Of these, there were 64 Total contractors, which included 49 
U.S. and 15 Foreign companies representing 11 countries (PM-BCT Acquisition Strategy 
update, 9 Feb 2000). 
The white paper responses varied from substantive suggestions with specific 
aspects of the RFP in mind, general comments on the program as a whole, down to 
product marketing sheets that provided no clear input. The white papers were reviewed 
by a special team of Government acquisition experts with backgrounds in design 
engineering, engineering for production, acquisition, contracting, product assurance and 
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test, configuration management, cost and systems analysis, contract management, and test 
and evaluation. 
The PM office's team summarized the substantive comments in the following 
eight concerns. First, there was obvious schedule risk, which they all recognized as being 
based on the expedient nature of the program. Some indicated that there may be 
significant difficulty in producing the quantities and mix of vehicle configurations in the 
time frame required. The recurring theme was that anything other than pure 
"unmodified" off-the-shelf systems would be very difficult to produce without this 
significant schedule risk. This limitation was highlighted in several periodical articles 
including one such article in Inside the Army, (Burger, January 2000) where the author 
wrote that the amount of time needed to achieve the required ramp up from initial 
capability to first unit equipped would "take considerably longer". 
The second concern was that there was no clear logistics concept. Their 
expectation was that the Army would specify the typical logistics regime using MIL-STD 
format. Some were surprised by the lack of detail and by the allowance of freedom to 
pick a method of support. The approaches, therefore, ranged from pure and traditional 
Government logistic support to pure Contractor Logistic Support (CLS). The PM office 
would eventually identify a more structured approach with definitive elements of both 
classic Government provisioning and CLS support. 
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The third concern was much more pointed. Several of the respondents were 
concerned that the requirements were skewed toward wheeled solutions while sacrificing 
mobility and survivability. The main contributing factor here was "perception as reality." 
The media coverage as well as the Chief of Staff s own words early in the development 
of the program tended towards a wheeled vehicle solution. The CSA stated more than 
once, before he even announced the program officially, that the Army needed a lighter 
and potentially wheeled force capable of sustained operations off of the tail-ramp of an 
aircraft such as the C-130. His statement in his 12 October 1999 speech to the AUS A 
symposium seemed to lean towards "wheels." 
In the follow-on press conference that he and Army Secretary Caldera gave, he 
solidified his true intent, which was to investigate whether industry had taken wheeled 
technology far enough along in capability to move to a wheeled combat vehicle fleet 
(Shinseki, GEN, October 1999). His words included a reference to the advancements in 
the commercial market with regard to wheeled technology. He further went on to say, 
"there is great capability, technology-wise, to lessen the weight of our vehicles." 
Together, wheeled technology and weight savings could support the Army asking itself 
about, "moving to wheels and away from tracks." When asked how long it would take, 
GEN Shinseki replied that he didn't know, but that the Army had a responsibility to ask 
itself that question and that he hoped that it would be, "much sooner, rather than later." 
If one were only paying attention to the speech without considering the interview 
that followed, he could perceive that the CSA's intent was to replace all combat vehicles 
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with wheeled vehicles right now without looking at the trade-offs. Many in the media 
interpreted his speech this way and there were tremendous debates that raged for months 
following. Newspaper and periodical articles appeared over the next year that both 
supported and decried the CSA's intent. Supporters pointed out the limitations the Army 
faced in deploying into Kosovo with Task Force Hawk and the effect on operation Task 
Force Ranger (Operation Restore Hope). In Kosovo, the Army was criticized for not 
being able to deploy quickly enough to have been a real threat and in Somalia, Army 
Rangers were rescued by US Forces using borrowed Malaysian Condor 6X6 vehicles 
(supported by Pakistani's Vietnam-era M-60 main battle tanks) (Bowden, 1999). Those 
opposed to GEN Shinseki's direction, object to medium forces for numerous reasons 
ranging from too light and perceived poor off-road mobility to the lack of sufficient 
lethality and survivability. (Army Times, "Wheels Vs. Tracks", February 2000) 
The debate carried over into the white paper process also, but more critically 
carried over into the legislative branch of the Government. Congressional interest picked 
up and eventually the Senate Armed Service Committee established a rider on the FY '01 
Defense Spending bill relative to answering the wheels versus track debate. The rider 
establishes that the Army must perform a Comparative Evaluation (CE) to take place 
before more than 20% of the total BCT budget can be obligated. I will provide more on 
the CE in Section 7 below. 
The fourth concern raised was that the requirements seemed to be precluding an 
off-the-shelf solution. The team reported that several of the offerors expressed concern 
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over the multitude of requirements that had to be met. In essence, no system would be 
capable of achieving all of the requirements without going through a developmental 
effort since the Army "loaded up" its requirements, which entail more risk. The PM 
office provided a prioritized performance banding matrix, RFP Attachment 16 (RFP 
DAAE07-00-R-M032, 6 April 2000) that allowed for trade-off of "Banded" requirements 
versus time. It was an objective matrix in that it provided that all requirements had to be 
met over time. KPPs had to be met immediately, Band 1 and Band 2 as well as unhanded 
requirements had to be met by the fifth brigade fielding. 
The fifth concern dealt with a general misunderstanding of the significance of the 
source selection bid sample. Often referred in the press as the "drive-off, shoot-off of 
the delivered systems, there was a general misunderstanding of what would actually 
occur and how the results would be used. This is very similar in character to the PPD 
perceptions in the discussion above. The bid sample evaluation was not intended to 
replace any aspect of the offerers' proposals. In fact, it was described as a demonstration 
of capability and was specifically limited to the ICV configuration in order to keep the 
evaluation simple and to ensure that the it could be completed in a timely manner. 
The sixth concern established that partnering would be critical to the success of 
the program. The Army agreed and had been working to include partnering requirements 
in the RFP. Based on the comments received, partnering was well taken. As pointed out 
in a recent GAO evaluation of partnering in the Department of Defense, there is still 
much to be done in terms of effectively applying teaming, partnering and EPTs. The 
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Executive Summary of the RFP identified the requirement and provided a web link to the 
"AMC Model Partnering for Success Process" website (RFP DAAE07-00-R-M032,6 
April 2000) 
The seventh concern addressed the apparent need for a systems integrator. 
Deemed either Government or contractor, the intent was to tie in the vehicle production, 
fielding and training of the IAVs with the force integration and transformation efforts 
involving existing equipment; the team accepted the recommendation. 
The eighth, final, summary concern was based on the expressed lack of a 
definition of First Unit Equipped. Tantamount to proving the success of the chosen 
contractor, they recommended that the definition include quantities of variants and 
timing, since there is an obvious impact on the offerers' ability to meet the required 
timelines. OSD PA&E also identified this shortcoming in their review of the Blue Book 
analysis. My assessment of the impact of the Blue Book analysis and how the PM 
resolved the issues is provided in Section 6 below. 
4. Full and Open Competition 
The original Commerce Business Daily announcement emphasized that the 
solicitation would include full and open competition. To ensure this, the PM used the 
market survey information in conjunction with the industry day attendance and inputs, to 
identify candidate contractors that seemed to be capable of meeting the program 
requirements as they existed at the time. A number of additional efforts were included in 
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developing the RFP that are not necessarily acquisition reform but part of intentional 
acquisition practices. 
As a result of the full and open competition there seemed to be a hesitation up to 
the point of proposals for any one potential offeror to publicly state that they could not 
folly meet the requirements of the RFP. More specifically, no offerors requested an 
extension of the RFP proposal deadline even though there was only 60 days to submit. 
This is highly unusual for major programs (Spitzbarth, 25 May 2001). In other words, no 
one wanted to tip their hand to show what they were "not" capable of for fear that a 
competitor would use that weakness against them in their proposal. Even though there 
were 612 questions answered as part of the Q&A process (more on this in Section 5 
immediately following), not once did a prospective offeror state they could not meet the 
Army's timeline or requirements. Even levels of risk were not substantiated publicly. 
Only in the white paper process did any potential offeror provide comments critical of the 
requirements, timeline and associated risks (reference Section 3 above). 
5. Draft RFPs 
The PM office developed its first draft performance specification in early January 
2000. In order to ensure the best trade-off occurred, PM-BCT established a weeklong 
review of the performance specification and invited the responsible TRADOC schools to 
participate in a working level review of the requirements. Although not a final look at 
the requirements, each of the schools was encouraged to come prepared for one final 
discussion of the requirements trade-offs before release of the first Draft RFP. Each of 
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the participants, combat and materiel developer alike, knew that changes would be 
scrutinized and therefore seemingly kept their comments to a minimum except on those 
requirements that they felt were worth their "falling on their sword". This is part of the 
"good and bad" aspect of intensive management. It was good in that the process was 
quite effective at communicating the most comprehensive and balanced set of 
requirements for the IBCT. It was bad in that it may not have been the most efficient 
method to reach the same end point. It was time efficient, yes, but not have been the 
most efficient use of available human resources since the requirements were so 
intensively managed and were fairly solid at this point in the process. 
The PM office posted the first Draft RFP on 30 December 1999 along with an 
initial version of the ORD (RFP DAAE07-00-R-M032, 30 December 1999). There was a 
rush to post the documents before the end of the calendar year and the documents were 
not of high caliber and were not comprehensive. The RFP was published as a Statement 
of Objectives (SOO) to allow the potential offerors maximum latitude to help the PM 
office refine the requirements. The PM quickly realized that the use of a SOO in this 
instance would not be sufficient, due to the complexity of the program and the severe 
time crunch the offerors were asked to work under. More detail would have to be 
provided. 
Industry responded to the PM's request for comments to the First Draft RFP. 
There were 221 questions submitted by industry that were then answered by the PM 
office. The Q&As were published on the TACOM acquisition web page. The PM 
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encouraged the offerers to ask any and all questions with the understanding that any 
question asked would be consolidated with others, answered and posted in a common 
web launch on the TACOM web page (1st Draft RFP, Statement to Offerers, 7 Mar 00). 
Answers came in three forms; those that clarified without need for modification to the 
RFP, those that clarified with need for minor modification to the RFP, and those that 
change requirements in the RFP completely and which were then added into the next 
submittal. The Q&As were posted to the web page as soon as a block of answers was 
completed and approved (as opposed to waiting for all answer to be completed). 
Approval consisted of a chain of key RFP persons including the technical expert, a 
contracting specialist, a TACOM lawyer, the PCO and the PM. 
With the Q&As in hand, the PM office then proceeded to modify the RFP, 
including the performance specification, and prepared a new submittal to industry. A 
new version of the ORD had also been posted with the First Draft RFP and the ORD 
necessitated changes to the performance specification as well. An interim version of the 
ORD was posted to the TACOM web page on 31 Jan 2000, which included significant 
changes. Of note was the solidification of the number of configurations and variants to 
11 vehicles. The number would be further pared to 10 when the Army determined that 
the technological leap to achieve a 155 mm Howitzer variant would be too great a 
challenge. The Howitzer variant is still an ORD requirement, but the Army has settled on 
a towed howitzer in lieu of a self-propelled model. In order to minimize the confusion, 
each time a document was submitted it was posted with a date "stamp" on it. 
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At the end of January, the PM office completed its first performance specification. 
Following intensive coordination with the user community, the Army published it and 
provided it to industry on 10 March 2000 as an attachment to the Second Draft RFP, 
which now included a Performance-based Statement of Work (SOW) (RFP DAAE07-00- 
R-M032,10 March 2000). In comparison, Section C of the SOO was 3 pages long when 
it was originally posted in December 1999. The new SOW contained a Section C that 
was 30 pages long and had numerous attachments that provided additional data and 
format requirements. 
When the PM office posted the Second Draft RFP, industry once again answered. 
There were 205 questions submitted to the Second Draft RFP, which covered 52 pages of 
text when down loaded. As before, the PM office answered and posted the Q&As to the 
acquisition web page in blocks of answers, as they became available. Due to the 
intensive management, as described above, the PM dictated that there would only be two 
draft solicitations. Any changes resulting from the Second Draft RFP would be rolled 
into the final, or formal, RFP on 6 April 2000, which was literally only weeks away. The 
changes incorporated also contributed to streamlining the source selection process and I 
will provide more on this aspect in Part B below. 
The Final RFP revision contained input from over 30 companies representing 9 
countries that covered the entire contractor spectrum from prime vehicle manufacturers to 
the lowliest supplier. Questions ranged from,' Vhy aren't you buying a howitzer with 
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this program?" to "what is a glad hand?" The numbers of Q&As per Draft RFP and ORD 
version are shown below (Table 3). 
Numbers of Q&A per Draft RFP and ORD 






RFP Q&As ORD 
First, 31 Dec 99 221 31 Dec 99 
31 Jan 00 
Second, 10 Mar 00 205 08 Feb 00 
Final, 06 Apr 00|           186| 06 Apr 00 
Table 3 - Numbers of Q&A per Draft RFP and ORD (Source: Researcher) 
A key component of the entire ORD process, which provided for a faster output, 
was the constant communication and cooperation between TACOM as the materiel 
developer and TRADOC as the combat developer. 
COL Schenk provided the following keys to the success of the program from the 
aspect of MATDEV and CBTDEV cooperation when he spoke to acquisition students at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (Schenk, COL, May 2000): 
• Constant Communication 
• IPTs Assure O&O, ORD, Specification and SOW Consistency 
• PM Involved in Their Activities 
• O&O Development 
• ORD Preparation 
• TRADOC Involved in Our Activities 
• RFP Development 
• Source Selection 
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•    PM Personal Reviews with GEN Abrams 
• Transformation Conferences 
• ORD Development, 19 Jan 00 
• ORD Finalization, 24-26 Jan 00 
• ORD to Spec Crosswalk, 10 Feb 00 
6. Fast Track 
Important to re-insert here is just how the program was started. On 12 October, 
1999 when speaking at the AUS A fall symposium, the Army's Chief of Staff, GEN 
Shinseki, stated that his vision was based on a lighter, more lethal, faster deployable, 
more highly mobile force that can arrive anywhere in the world within 96 hours 
(Shinseki, GEN, October 1999). What followed was a massive reformation effort within 
the Army acquisition community to develop a program to meet his vision. A common 
quote from the PM BCT office came from COL Schenk when we spoke to the TACOM 
community as they developed the program, "Remember just who the Chief Engineer on 
this program is." What he meant was that GEN Shinseki was very interested and 
involved in the acquisition process of the JJBCT and therefore any requirement had to be 
able to pass a "four star" review. When COL Schenk was given the task to develop the 
PM office by MG Caldwell, the TACOM Commander, he was literally given carte 
blanche' to bring in talent from the entire TACOM command structure. With few 
exceptions, the people he chose were brought into the office and immediately set to work 
on building the Provisional PM; the program office was provisional in the sense that the 
program existed but was neither funded in the current year nor did it appear in the POM. 
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Contmiffed to Excellence 4 May 00 
Figure 8 - PM BCT, Complexity of Management (From Ref. PM-BCT, 4 May 2000) 
The program stood up as an AMC PM organization on 18 Jan 00 but would not be 
recognized as a formal PM office until the beginning of the FY01 when it transitioned to 
the PEO for Ground Combat Support Systems (PEO-GCSS). No matter the specific 
chain-of-command, the management structure (Figure 7 above) was still complicated 
given the number of contributors and customers that the IBCT affected and whose 
influences had to be considered. 
Although the PM brought in the "best of the best" from TACOM's personnel, the 
staffing effort was somewhat mired in political pulls with existing programs and tenant 
programs in Warren, MI. The PEO-GCSS wanted to ensure that the IBCT program came 
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under their control and but the Commander of the Army Materiel Command had been 
directed by the CSA to lead the program. In the Army acquisition scheme, the program 
executives, responsible for weapon system development, do not report to the 
Commander, Army Materiel Command but do receive matrix support from that 
organization. Although the PM received adequate support to staff to a minimum working 
level through transfers and matrix assignments, there was some hesitation for folks to join 
the program management office. As is typical of DoD new program starts, with their 
attendant organizational changes, the new jobs were seen by some as unstable. The 
personnel problems did not smooth out for about a year. Some staffing problems 
persisted, even after the program officially transitioned under PEO control, in December 
2000 (Hoeper, April 2000). 
With the exception of the duration of the SSEB, the staffing of the PM office 
lagged behind that which would normally be required to run a program the size of the 
BCT. Including contractor support, for example, the PM offices for Bradley, Abrams, 
and FMTV, contain 188,148, and 73 persons respectively for an average of 136 persons 
(Masyra, Email, 7 June 2001). Referring to Figure 8 below, the BCT PM office was run 
by less than half of that average for the first year of its existence, except for the 
supplemental staffing during the SSEB. To make matters worse, several key persons 
were tasked to participate in the SSEB and therefore the PM office became even more 
shorthanded. The current PM-BCT staffing is at 123 persons, with 97 Government 












Apr-00 May-00 Aug-00 Sep-00 
QSSEB- 
BCORE/MATRIX        * 30    33    38    38    38    47    55    59    64    74    83    82    84    97 
*The numbers represent full-time and part-time personnel that participated in the SSEB. 
Funding does not reflect costs that were not reimbursed. 
Figure 9 - PM BCT Staffing Shortfall (After Ref. PM-BCT, Apr 01) 
Another significant aspect of this part of the procurement process was the overall 
speed at which the program was expected to move. This is especially significant with 
objective, or desired, First Unit Equipped (FUE) and Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 
dates of March 2001 and December 2001 respectively. The PM staff expected that 
acquisition reform would certainly be at the heart of the procurement and there would not 
be a protracted requirements determination process. Only through intensive and iterative 
management of the requirements along with senior Army political expertise would this 
program succeed as explained below. 
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a) Intensive Management 
Intensive as used here meant General Officer involvement in the 
generation of requirements throughout. This served good and bad purposes, as the cycle 
time for decisions was often swift, but not necessarily popular at the working level. For 
example, Headquarters TRADOC (HQTRADOC) did not designate one of its 
subordinate commands as a primary combat developer as it normally does. This program 
was infantry-centric, meaning a family of vehicles centered on a common chassis that 
took soldiers to the fight rather than serving as a fighting platform such as the Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle. Therefore, the Infantry Center and School seemed to be a logical 
choice. However, with the vehicles needing armor survivability characteristics, the 
Armor Center and School would also seem to be a good choice. 
Other schools also had critical involvement such as with fire support 
(Field Artillery School, Ft. Sill, OK), maneuver support (Engineers and Chemical from 
the Maneuver Center, Ft. Leonard Wood), and interoperable communications (Ft. 
Gordon). One could therefore make a good case, then, that the respective schools should 
have been given responsibility to "manage" their piece of the requirements determination 
process. In response, HQTRADOC did give responsibility to the respective schools, but 
it gave neither the final approval of the requirements nor the bureaucratic time to allow 
the process to move at its normal pace. The entire process that normally takes one to two 
years depending on the size and complexity of a program, in effect, occurred in just 6 
months. Therefore, the only way the HQTRADOC saw that it could complete the 
requirements determination process was through intensive management of the entire 
process (US Army Transformation Campaign Plan, July 2000). 
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b) Iterative Management 
Iterative as used here meant development of the contractual, 
programmatic, and requirements documents simultaneously with iterative break points 
for synchronization. Three major events occurred that were the central drivers for the 
requirements determination process. The Platform Performance Demonstration (PPD), 
the White Paper submittals, and the use of Draft RFPs solidified the requirements for the 
program. The fact that they occurred nearly at the same time is significant. The PPD 
occurred in early January 2000, the white papers were due soon after the PPD, and the 
Draft RFPs were presented electronically to the offerers in February 2000. 
c) Simultaneous Requirements Development and Validation 
While the Program office worked the PPD, the White Papers and the Draft 
RFPs, HQTRADOC held a General Officer panel to develop the Operational and 
Organization (O&O) plan. Normally the result of months of sequential review and 
revision, the O&O was drafted in one week and published electronically to the combat 
developer community for refinement. HQTRADOC also provided it to the PM office for 
initiation of the performance specification. At the same time, the Blue Book analysis was 
completed. To reiterate the point made in Chapter III (Paragraph B.l), this was done by 
HQTRADOC in place of the AoA that normally occurs to identify other means to counter 
a newly identified limitation in national security. 
The results of the Blue Book were not distributed below senior Army 
leadership. The limitations that it identified and the chosen path forward were the subject 
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of several Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) meetings (OSD PA&E Memo, 
10 March 2000). The results of the OIPTs were the baseline requirements and Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) that formed the basis of the ORD. While not scathing, 
the accompanying OSD PA&E memo provided several pointed comments on the 
acquisition approach and operational KPPs that had to be addressed in order to gain 
OSD's 100% support. The PM and TRADOC partnered to provide solutions or detail 
explanations for the points made. 
For instance, the PA&E memo suggested that the PM should allow for 
separate contracts to mitigate risks as the acquisition strategy was for "winner-takes-all" 
(PM-BCT Industry Day, October 1999). In response the PM revised the acquisition 
strategy to provide for multiple contract awards (Acquisition Strategy Report, 17 March 
2000). They also provided for an award differentiation between systems that were 
production ready and systems that required some development. The PA&E memo also 
opined that the PM had not performed an adequate risk analysis and milestone 
assessment for achieving MS III, further exacerbating the winner-takes-all strategy. The 
PM's response not only identified their risk assessment and milestone strategies in detail 
but also lined out how they would handle several contingent versions of contract award. 
These included if several vehicle configurations were identified to be production ready, 
the PM would ask for LRIP approval for those vehicles only. Then, the PM would 
identify, "discrete program schedules based on system maturity" of the remaining 
systems. (PM-BCT, Briefing to OSD, 14 Apr 00) 
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In effect, the PM office could execute a finite number of developmental 
and production contractual efforts simultaneously on the ICV variant with one contractor 
and execute a parallel effort for production and/or development for the MGS variant with 
another contractor. This fact was accepted favorably by industry and was reflected in the 
proposals presented to the PM (Baumgardner, Defense Daily, March 2000). 
Similarly, TRADOC identified the analytical tools and methodologies it 
used to conclude its KPP requirements. Again, even though they did not perform a 
formal AoA, the efforts that they performed simultaneously with the rest of the 
acquisition proved sufficient to justify the KPPs. The TRADOC analysis efforts occurred 
across its many analysis centers and combat development centers including: 
• TRAC operational analysis using Vector-in-Command (VIC), Janus, and 
Computer Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX) war gaming softwares 
• CAC/CGSC performing C4IAR analysis using PMJ along with SME's 
• Field Artillery School performing fire support analysis using Fire 
Simulation (FireSJJVI) XXI, 
• Army ARMC and Infantry centers performing Modular Semi-automated 
Forces (ModSAF), Janus, and Joint Conflict and Tactical Center 
(JCATS) 
• CASCOM performing deployment analysis using spreadsheet models. 
(TRAC BCT Analyses brief 17 Nov 99) 
Using the validated KPPs, TRADOC performed a whole range of analysis 
in urban, complex, open and rolling plains, and desert terrains as well as ranges of 
operations involving Support and Stabilization Operations (SASO), small scale 
contingency (SSC) and Major Theatre War (MTW). They compared prototype BCT 
brigades with Mechanized/Armor brigades against foes that were equal in capability as 
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well as foes with far greater capabilities to identify limitations. The output not only 
answered the PA&E questions, it also assisted in re-baselining the BCT O&O plan. 
7. Comparative Evaluation 
The Senate Armed Service Committee placed a 20% rider on the BCT production 
budget until they complete a side-by-side CE (Ref. White Paper Section above). LTG 
Kern described this as unnecessary experimentation when he spoke to an Inside the Army 
reporter in May 2000. He expressed his dismay in the following statement, "We've been 
doing experiments for 10 years. So what we do want to get on with is fielding urgent 
requirements that are capabilities we know exist" (Kern, LTG, May 2000) 
The CE, as written, must include an evaluation of the IBCT LAV Ill-based LAV 
as compared to a representative medium weight system already in the Army inventory. 
The only medium weight system in the Army inventory is the tracked Ml 13 family of 
vehicles. In fact, the committee language states that they, "believe it is possible that the 
Army may already have equipment in the inventory that could meet the requirements 
established for the interim force". Senator Lieberman (PBS Frontline, October 2000) and 
Senator Santorum (Burger and Dupont, Inside the Army, 9 October 2000) stated in 
separate interviews that their intent essentially was to ensure that the Army was not 
wasting money that could be used more effectively for the Objective Force. Therefore 
they felt compelled to require an operational test. Whether the CE proves the Senators' 
viewpoints won't be known until 3QFY '02. Until then, the PM has to plan the 
evaluation, which is taking up time and resources. At best, the CE may prove the worn- 
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out medium systems come close to meeting new requirements. At worst, the older 
medium systems might perform better; this is counterintuitive. 
8. Good Acquisition Reform 
There is one key question to answer at this moment, "How does this relate to 
acquisition reform?" The answer is simple but difficult to prove. A good acquisition is 
based on good solid requirements or as Professor Orin Marvel of the Naval Postgraduate 
School puts it, solid requirements as an output from the requirements generation process 
set you up for, "Doing the right thing right." 
The effort that the PM office underwent, including market survey, PPD, White 
Papers, and Draft RFPs, was fully dependent on effective communication and 
cooperation with TRADOC and the prospective offerers. In the end, the PM ensured that 
good supportable requirements existed prior to releasing the Draft RFP to industry. The 
requirements were further refined based on industry's input to the Draft RFPs, but the 
foundation was laid. 
B.        SOURCE SELECTION 
This part of the chapter looks at acquisition reform that was applied to the source 
selection process from the release of the receipt of proposals through contract award. To 
better describe disadvantages and advantages that acquisition brought to the IAV 
procurement, I will look at the source selection from two different angles. 
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First, for reasons that I will explain, the source selection took longer than a typical 
medium weight vehicle system that TACOM has procured. I will look at what might 
have caused the source selection to go longer than TACOM's average. Although the 
delay was caused primarily by the complexity of the IAV program itself, there were 
several distinct reasons for the additional delay. They included the total number of 
proposals submitted, issues regarding the complexity of the RFP, availability of critical 
GFE items, and late August and early September changes to the RFP. 
Second, I will contrast the longer time with better getting a better quality product. 
I will analyze the distinct acquisition reform initiatives that qualitatively improved the 
source selection process but that didn't necessarily shorten its duration. The initiatives 
include, the contract formulation including a diverse set of attachments to the SOW, a 
newly created side-by-side Table LM, electronic commerce (E-commerce), the use of 
discussions (written and oral), model contracting methods, the minimum use of 
Government Specs and Standards, the use of bid sample evaluation, and the "luxury" of 
resources to complete the task. 
1. Reasons for Elongation of the Source Selection Process 
Although the PMO originally planned to complete the source selection in less 
than 90 days, the actual effort took approximately 160 days. In comparison, the 
acquisition of programs that were either similar in size or dollar value had an average of 
108 days (range: 68-169) without the AGMS outlier (Figure 9 below). When including 
the AGMS, which had significant pre-award bid sample user testing, fixes, and 
discussions, the average time increases to 125 days. 
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Figure 10 - Source selection times (After Ref. TACOM CM Brief, Nov 1999) 
The first reason for this elongation was due to the RFP itself. The RFP was very 
complex since the proposals had to be delivered in three parts for each offeror if they 
proposed to deliver the complete IAV family. There had to be separate ICV only, MGS 
only, and combined proposals in order for the SSEB to be able to evaluate a split award. 
The PM had expected 4 or 5 offerors to propose with at least two proposing only the ICV 
(which happened) thus leaving three offerors to propose the total IAV family. This 
would have meant about 12 proposals max. Instead the SSEB had to evaluate 17 of 20 
proposals received after three were removed as being non-responsive (Table 4). 
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Two offerors submitted only ICVs 2 
One Offeror proposed the ICV, MGS and Combined 3 
One Offeror proposed four different proposals 
for the ICV, MGS, and Combined 12 
Three Offerors were determined to be non-responsive 3 
Total = 20 
Table 4 - Total number of Proposals (Source: Researcher) 
Second, there were several complex attachments to the RFP that required the 
offerors to compile substantive amounts of data. The most difficult attachments for them 
to compile were Attachment 5 - GFE and Attachment 21 - System Architecture List of 
Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE). With most of the listed items being 
communication and electronic gear that contributed to the interoperability KPP, 
determining which items would be best given as GFE versus accepted as CFE items 
turned out to be a larger task than anticipated. Not only did the GFE items require 
integration of complex electronic and communication equipment, which include their 
own space, power, temperature, and EMI difficulties, but the effort also required space 
claims for items that either were not fully developed or did not exist. Further, there were 
questions on some key GFE components as to whether the contractor could ultimately 
provide the same or similar item as CFE faster than as a GFE. The intent of providing 
GFE was to save time and to guarantee that the IAV systems would meet then- 
interoperability requirements. However, the conundrum was that providing GFE 
detracted from contractor innovation, a major desire of acquisition reform. 
90 
Add to this, the complexity of the 10 vehicles times with 10 different missions 
and the task becomes more difficult. The C4ISR community worked hard to solidify the 
requirements and the systems architecture. Changes to GFE and CFE were included in 
nearly every revision to the RFP, including the drafts before the formal release and the 
final RFP. Essentially, the offerors were "tasked" into C4ISR subcontract support in 
order to ensure that they covered the all requirements completely. The actual integration, 
as opposed to the proposed effort, will be the measure of how well the requirements were 
written. 
Another significant contributor to the elongated source selection process was due 
to the Army's refinement of the RFP and the SOW in late August and again in early 
September 2000. The changes were published as amendments 5 and 6 to the RFP. 
Dealing with complex FSV and NBCRV contractor responsibilities as well as more GFE 
availability issues, they contributed to the offerors needing more response time. As a 
result, the SSEB needed more evaluation time after the offerors submitted their 
responses. One can not accurately identify the exact effect on the source selection 
process even though Amendments 5 and 6 were not significant changes. The net effect 
probably resulted in adding approximately four weeks of effort to the overall evaluation 
schedule. 
The significance in this section is that even though it appears from the data 
presented above (Figure 10) that the IAV source selection lasted longer than most 
TACOM medium weight vehicle systems, there is no direct way to draw good 
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comparisons. Each of the systems presented was far less complicated than the IAV and 
each was based on singular vehicles or simple families of items. 
2. Qualitative improvements to the Source Selection Process 
The most significant contribution to improving the source selection was the 
formulation of the contract and the RFP. The RFP was formatted with normal sections A 
through M but the PM also included 27 attachments. The attachments were used as 
detailed clarifiers to the RFP; mainly the SOW. The intent was to baseline the 
information provided to the offerers and to present them a singular information source 
and format for submittal of their proposals. There were detailed lists, required blank 
matrices, data sheets, agreements, equipment lists, detailed instructions, modeling and 
test standards, and program objective documents. Much of the information would 
normally have been provided within the SOW that would have made it much larger (more 
pages) than the PM planned. By using the attachments, the PM office was able to 
provide much more detail to support the RFP without a perception of over-kill in terms of 
the requirements. (Spitzbarth, 25 May 2001). 
Next, the PM office added more qualitative improvements to the RFP by 
establishing many contractual incentives and features to encourage the offerors (PM- 
BCT, 9 February 2000). As discussed previously, the RFP contained fixed price, and 
cost plus contract types with fixed, award, and incentive fee aspects. The production 
contract would be awarded as a FFP requirements contract with a price reduction dis- 
incentive for late deliveries. The SDD portions would be CPIF/AF with incentives on 
cost. Also included was award fee for maximizing commonality and improving the SDD 
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schedule. There were options for PDOS in terms of the SDD effort along with Design to 
Unit Cost incentives. And lastly, there was FFP for Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) 
on a per vehicle, time phased basis. The RFP also contained allowances for the offerers 
to receive "credit" for exceeding the basic requirements of the Performance Specification. 
For instance, the ability to exceed an individual requirement or increase the likelihood of 
meeting a desired requirement, "would be considered an advantage to the extent it 
provides benefit to the BCT" (RFP DAAE07-00-R-M032, Section M.1.9, 6 April 2000). 
The SSEB evaluated the merits of each proposal along these lines and took into account 
the extent to which each offeror could be incentivized and the Army could benefit. 
Furthering the effort was a novel use of a side-by-side Table LM that brought 
together the instructions to the offerors on how to put their proposal together from 
Section L and posted them along side the Section M description on how the SSEB would 
evaluate the proposals. TACOM corporate management has used similar charts and 
tables to more clearly define the connection, but never on such a large effort and never 
quite as comprehensively as was used for the IAV RFP (Spitzbarth, 25 May 2001). The 
data required to support the complex source selection was therefore provided in a clear 
and concise format. The Table LM requirements were established by the PM office in 
such a way that the SSEB was provided with both the data and the method of evaluation. 
With the established format, the SSEB was provided with all of the information it needed 
to complete their evaluation. 
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The source selection board employed additional discussions beyond those already 
employed before the release of the RFP. Throughout the process, the PM had involved 
industry. In the source selection process, they continued to use open discussions to 
support the decision process. The SSEB employed written, teleconference, and face-to- 
face discussions. The discussions had the same purposes during source selection as they 
did in writing the RFP, to build the best understanding of the IAV requirements so that 
the offerors could best bid against them. What made the discussions different here is that 
the discussions were not shared with all. Referring back to Chapter III, the results of all 
discussions leading up to the release of the RFP and through to the submittal of 
proposals, all questions that were asked were answered to all offerors. Here, discussions 
occurred between the SSEB and the respective offerer only. The results of the 
discussions were intellectual understanding. At no time were meeting minutes used to 
modify the proposals; only a written notice from the offerer could do that. In other 
words, the offerors could use the information (understanding) to make changes to their 
proposal and the SSEB would not infer from a conversation that the proposal was 
changed until such written notification was received. 
Discussions typically started with written Items for Discussion (IFD) that had to 
be answered in writing, again, to make their response official. IFD responses became 
part of the contract when submitted and as with all changes, the proposals were updated 
iteratively. That is to say that the proposal would not be resubmitted as a whole when its 
parts were changed. This was the case for all changes including the Amendments to the 
RFP that occurred after release of the RFP as well as the Final Proposal Revisions. The 
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SSEB continued using teleconferences and face-to-face discussions to discuss issues from 
the EFDs or RFP Amendments. Each offeror was also brought in for formal face-to-face 
discussions in July to discuss their overall understanding of the RFP, evaluation data 
from the bid sample event, and any outstanding issues from the IFD process. 
The offerers submitted changed pages for only such parts of their proposal that 
changed relative to discussions. With each submittal, the changes were re-evaluated and 
the respective changes to the SSEB evaluation were created. Obviously, some iterative 
changes made large impacts on the offer when combined. Using the iterative approach 
saved time in that the offeror and the SSEB could concentrate on what changed and the 
net effect rather than having to re-evaluate the entire proposal. 
With regard to specs and standards, Secretary Perry made sweeping changes with 
his acquisition reform efforts in 1994 and all but eliminated the use of Military Specs and 
Standards. Through a concerted effort on the PM's part, the RFP was released with only 
seven Government Specs and Standards. Although some felt that the elimination of all 
but these seven would make it more difficult on the offerers, the Source Selection process 
was not negatively impacted. To have a positive affect, two things had to happen. First, 
there had to be trust since the SSEB must understand the commercial or Industrial Specs 
and Standards that are submitted and trust that the offeror does also. And second, there 
had to be a commercial or industrial standard to use. Otherwise, the offeror submits his 
proposal using Government Specs and Standards of his own volition. The most popular 
specs and standards that were used involve design and engineering attributes that evolved 
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from the Government during the last 50 years. These areas included Human Factors, 
MANPRINT, safety, survivability, transportability and mobility. Although not 
exclusively military, most of the offerers used Government Specs or Standards with 
"modification" or tailoring to support their proposals. 
This leads us straight into the next area of acquisition reform, the use of model 
contracts. The offerors were given maximum flexibility to modify and tailor major 
aspects of the RFP with the understanding that they would sign those changes into any 
contract they received. The model contracting process allows for the offeror to impose 
their own changes on the final contract they sign as long as basic fundamental aspects of 
the RFP are met. The changes are evaluated and agreed or not agreed to by the SSEB. If 
accepted, the changes are written into the model contract. If not, the changes are 
discussed to the point of acceptance and then incorporated. In the end, the model 
contract mirrors the intent of the PM as well as the offeror to the extent that both are 
willing to sign a contract if selected. 
Some of these attributes of success may seem to contradict the Army's desire to 
complete the source selection process quickly. In contrast to that opinion, however, the 
SSEB was resourced with one luxury item. They were given full access to the best 
resources the Army (and the DoD) had to offer. These resources included people, 
funding, facilities, and intellect. Staffed by almost 300 persons initially, the SSEB 
contained nearly 150 persons for most of the duration of the board (PM-BCT brief, April 
2001). The US Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) facilities at Aberdeen 
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Proving Ground, MD were used to the maximum extent, DoD support was provided both 
internally and externally to the effort, as well as the best inter service support I have ever 
witnessed. 
The Army's premier ground vehicle test facility completed the bid sample 
evaluation for the SSEB in two months time, 6 June until 6 August 2000. I discussed the 
use of bid sample evaluations in Chapter III, but the effort was intended to affirm the 
proposed capabilities of the offerors' ICV vehicles. This formed the foundation of the 
offers and the JAV program since for the most part, the ICV underpins the entire IAV 
program. The effort completed by ATEC was made available to the offerors through 
their "Vision" database as well as through daily coordination meetings. The Vision 
database access was established for the bid sample evaluation as it was referenced in the 
Executive Summary to the RFP (RFP DAAE07-00-R-M032, 6 April 2000). 
Web link access was given to the offerors in order to allow them to download the 
evaluation data in a timely manner as was mentioned in Chapter III. Timeliness was 
critical to ensure that the results could provide the offerors some feedback on how close 
their vehicle came to meeting the critical requirements. It would be used both to verify 
content of offerors' written proposals and provide physical proof of performance. One 
additional support statement is found in Section M of the RFP, which contained the 
following with regard to the use of bid sample evaluation data, "M.1.4 The results of the 
bid sample evaluation will be used to verify the relevant content of the written portion of 
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the offerer's proposal and will be considered in conjunction with the evaluation of the 
performance requirements" (RFP DAAE07-00-R-M032, 6 April 2000). 
The last significant area of acquisition reform that benefited the source selection 
process was the use of electronic commerce (E-commerce). The SSEB relied on Email, 
datafax, and electronic data transfer to submit changes to and from the offerors. The 
normal time frame for a response to each IFD submitted was about one week. This 
would not have been possible without E-commerce. The entire RFP was posted 
electronically including through Amendment 4. The later ones, Amendments 5 and 6, 
occurred after the delivery of proposals and therefore were not posted on the TACOM 
web page. They were transmitted via Email to expedite them. 
C.        PROTEST 
The Army awarded the IAV contract worth $4 Billion to General Motors/General 
Dynamics Land Systems Defense Group, L.L.C. (GM/GDLS) on 16 November 2000 
based on a best value determination (DAAE07-00-D-M05,16 November 2000). 
The SSA pointed out in his Source Selection Decision memorandum (SSDM, 16 
November 2000), that GM/GDLS's ICV proposal was significantly superior to the United 
Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP) proposal(s) in the performance and supportability 
areas. He further stated that UDLP's proposal no.l was superior to the GM/GDLS 
proposal in the schedule area and significantly superior to the GM/GDLS proposal in the 
price/cost area. Overall, the SSA determined that GM/GDLS's significant performance 
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and supportability advantages outweighed UDLP's significant schedule and superior 
cost/price areas. 
With regard to the MGS, the SSA pointed out that the GM/GDLS MGS proposal 
was significantly superior to the UDLP MGS proposal in the performance and 
supportability areas and outweighed the fact that UDLP's MGS proposal was superior to 
the GM/GDLS proposal in the schedule and cost/price areas. 
UDLP, felt that they had delivered a better proposal and protested the award with 
the General Accounting Offices (GAO) on 4 December 2000. UDLP's protest was 
multifaceted in that it covered nearly every aspect of the SSEB evaluations and the SSA's 
decision. Federal Statutes protect the source selection process, the protest process, and 
all generated documents with regard to a source selection. Therefore, I can only discuss 
those protest documents that have been publicly released. 
With that in mind there is only one such protest document, the redacted version of 
the GAO decision on 9 April 2001. Since the GAO decision covers the facts that they 
felt had the most contention with regard to the award and protest, I will summarize the 
GAO response and discuss any implications to acquisition reform. The Digest paragraph 
of the decision contained two main points for denying the protest. I have included the 
paragraph in its entirety: 
Protest against award of single contract for both infantry carrier vehicle (ICV) and 
mobile gun system (MGS) variants of the new family of armored vehicles is denied 
where (1) awardee's proposal for ICV, accounting for approximately 89 percent of new 
vehicles in contemplated brigade, was reasonably evaluated as offering significant 
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performance and supportability advantages which outweigh protester's schedule and 
price/cost advantages, and (2) although awardee's schedule for deploying MGS was very 
disadvantageous and evaluation did not fully reflect certain disadvantages with respect to 
ammunition stowage in awardee's MGS, its proposal nevertheless offered other 
performance and supportability advantages, and selection of awardee's MGS would 
result in commonality between the ICV and MGS, such that award for both variants was 
not unreasonable (GAO Decision, 9 April 2001). 
The GAO decision next synopsized the SSA's SSD memorandum and concluded 
with a statement that they, "reviewed the record and find no basis to question the award." 
The GAO then summarized the major contentions of UDLP's protest, point-by-point, and 
commented on the validity of each argument. The protest points regarded performance, 
cost, and schedule issues based on the proposals and performance advantages and 
disadvantages to the BCT. Since there were no parts of UDLP's protest arguments that 
dealt with acquisition reform, the protest issues are outside the scope of this thesis. With 
the protest denied, the Army was able to start work with GM/GDLS on 9 April 2001. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to investigate the application of DoD acquisition 
reform to major system procurement. It was woven into a case study of the processes and 
initiatives evoked and it focused on what the Army employed to develop an ACAT ID 
major weapon system within 16 months after program initiation. My research included a 
discussion of the relative merits of acquisition reform processes and hindrances 
encountered with such processes. I employed an iterative approach to completing the 
thesis and refocused the effort as the program unfolded. Due to a protest of the contract 
as awarded, I also researched the impact that acquisition reform might have had on the 
protest. 
This Chapter is intended to serve as an end point, but also as a start point. It is an 
end point for this thesis and the potential start point for a follow-on effort. I will present 
my conclusions based on the research I completed and the analysis from the earlier 
chapters of this thesis. I will answer my primary and subsidiary research questions and 
then I will recommend areas of further research interest for future Naval Postgraduate 
School students. 
A.        BASIC RESEARCH QUESTION 
What has been the impact of DoD acquisition reform on the development of the 
Brigade Combat Team? From program initiation to contract award, the entire IAV 
procurement effort totaled only 11 months. This is completely unheard of for a major 
weapon system. I am certain that the effort to develop and award the IAV production 
101 
contract could have only been accomplished with the use of acquisition reform initiatives 
described in this thesis. 
Along the way, the PM office applied many different facets of acquisition reform. 
They used a multi-faceted approach to develop the requirements that heavily involved 
industry. The PM drafted the performance requirements and then used acquisition reform 
initiatives such as the following to build the RFP: 
• Market Surveys with Prototype Demonstrations 
• Industry White Papers 
• Advanced Planning Briefs to Industry 
• Competitive Solicitation 
• Oral and Written Discussions 
• Draft RFPs with Question and Answer 
This list parallels my Chapter IV Part A analysis. 
After delivery of the offerer's proposals, the SSEB applied many innovative 
acquisition reform initiatives such as: 
• bid sample evaluations 
• open written and oral discussions 
• E-commerce 
None of these initiatives singularly provided the PM the ability to make the 
contract award so quickly, but combining the efforts provided the means to accelerate the 
entire operational and performance requirements processes as well as support the efforts 
of source selection evaluation board. 
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In my analysis, I concentrated on two aspects of acquisition reform. First was the 
aspect of reducing acquisition time and second was the aspect of procuring a better 
product. I looked at each aspect individually. 
As delineated above, the time aspect has two parts, the efforts from program 
initiation up to release of the RFP and the efforts from receipt of proposals up to contract 
award (disregarding the 60 days in between for proposal development). What I found 
was there were distinct detractors that elongated the source selection in spite of the 
acquisition reform initiatives. Even though it appears from the data presented in Chapter 
IV Figure 10, that the IAV source selection lasted longer than most TACOM medium 
weight vehicle systems, there is no direct way to draw good comparisons. Each of the 
systems presented was far less complicated than the IAV and each was based on singular 
vehicles or simple families of items. I will summarize the detractors as well as the 
positive outcomes of applying acquisition reform to the source selection efforts in the 
answers to the subsidiary questions below. 
Second, that the requirements determination effort, development of the 
performance specification, and the completion of the RFP effort were completed from 
program initiation to release of the formal RFP in less than 6 months. What resulted was 
a streamlined solicitation that had been developed by a team of carefully selected 
acquisition experts from the Army and DoD. They employed multiple facets of 
acquisition reform in the completion of their task. I will address these facets in more 
detail as I provide the answers to the subsidiary thesis questions below. 
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B.        SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
From the basic research question, the following subsidiary questions were developed: 
1. What is the Brigade Combat Team: Background and overview? 
2. What attributes of acquisition reform are relevant to the BCT? 
3. What areas of acquisition reform are being employed to execute the program? 
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages that acquisition reform brings to 
the BCT? 
5. What conclusions and follow-on recommendations can be drawn from 
applying acquisition reform to the BCT? 
1. What is the Brigade Combat Team: Background and Overview? 
I answered this research question in detail in Chapter II. In Summary, the BCT as 
a new medium weight, combat vehicle program. As a system of systems, it is a 
responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and mobile force intended for 
operations anywhere in the world within 96 hours. The BCT consists of 10IAV vehicles 
that are based on one common chassis. The 10 vehicles are based on 2 variants, the 
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). The ICV has 8 
additional configurations: Mortar Carrier, Anti-Tank Guided Missile, Reconnaissance 
Vehicle, Commander's Vehicle, Fire Support Vehicle, Engineer Squad Vehicle, Nuclear 
Chemical Biological Reconnaissance Vehicle, and Medical Evacuation Vehicle. Each 
configuration and variant serves individual combat and combat support functions on the 
battlefield. 
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The BCT effort is rooted in several previous Army development attempts, but 
succeeds where previous attempts at transformation had failed. The BCT succeeded in 
that it was the first medium weight, combat vehicle system that the Army accepted for 
production on the basis of very limited experimentation. The Army had learned from the 
previous attempts at transformation such as the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and the 
Strike Force concepts and picked up where these previous attempts had stalled in 
developing medium weight combat systems. The LAV development also went beyond 
just vehicles expanding into a transformation including people, equipment, doctrine, and 
leadership. The BCT is the first program established to "buy" the ability to deliver a 
strategic response as opposed to experimentation and studies of how to do it. The Army 
is learning as it transforms with simultaneous and iterative applications of technology, 
training, tactics, and procedures that are employed in three major efforts. 
The first effort is the Initial Brigade Combat Team that initiates the 
transformation process. Units at Ft. Lewis, Washington have transitioned to a Medium 
Weight force structure and are training on surrogate and "in-lieu-of' systems that are 
predecessors of the Interim Brigade Combat Team weapon systems. 
The Interim Brigade Combat Team, the second effort, is spearheaded by the 
acquisition of the Interim Armored Vehicle. The LAV will be fielded to the units at Ft. 
Lewis to replace the surrogates and in-lieu-of systems once significant production 
quantities exist. 
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The final effort is the Objective Force. The Army's Objective Force will have 
Future Combat System (FCS) combat platforms that will replace the Interim Armored 
Vehicles and be operational in the year 2020. The Objective Force is still early in its 
development. 
What makes the BCT unique is that the previous programs were unable to exit the 
experimentation stage and proceed into development and production. The Army Chief of 
Staff, GEN Shinseki, directed the Army to procure the BCT and field it as quickly as 
possible. The Army acquisition community went through a massive transformation effort 
to develop a program to meet his vision; this included many acquisition reform 
initiatives. Streamlined processes had to be used to meet the CSA's schedule. The Army 
has employed an intensive and iterative management effort to develop the IAV 
requirements from off-the-shelf capabilities with plans for eventual technology block 
improvements. GEN Shinseki also set in motion a transformation of the Army light and 
heavy combat brigades to make them strategically responsive while still meeting the 
National Military Strategy. 
2. What attributes of acquisition reform are relevant to the BCT? 
I answered this research question in detail in Chapter II, Part A. In summary, I 
first researched to determine what acquisition reform was and realized that there was no 
single source document that fully described acquisition reform. Two explanations, 
however, highlighted the tenets, initiatives, ideas, and tips that make up acquisition 
reform. Through analysis of recent DoD and Army guidance, a connection emerged 
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between the DoD focus areas and the Army's Streamlining Tips. Both references are 
available in the Defense Acquisition Deskbook. 
While not all encompassing, the significant DoD acquisition reform focus areas 
include the following: 
• Reliance on an integrated civil-military industrial base 
• Reliance on price and schedule in design development 
• Logistics on demand; agile and reliable logistic processes 
• Reduced DoD acquisition infrastructure overhead 
• Enhanced DoD workforce training 
• Continuous improvement with systematic change management 
To this more recent list are added a few more focus areas that are that reflect best 
practices and common sense applications of acquisition reform: 
• Communication with industry 
• Performance Based Requirements 
• Teaming 
• Minimum number of key performance parameters 
The above focus areas are supported by the Army's top 20 tips for streamlining of 
which are shown below as applicable to major systems acquisition: 
Eliminating Specs and Standards 
Electronic Commerce (E-commerce) 
Single Process Initiatives 
Multi-year Agreements 
Streamlining Contract Requirements 
Commercial Test Equipment 
Single Acquisition Management Plan 
Procuring Commercial Items 
Commercializing Contract Requirements 
Alpha Contracting 
Partnering 
New Uniform Contract Format 
Power-down Authority 
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•    Cost as an Independent Variable (CATV) 
Part of the thesis effort was then to analyze how well the Army's streamlining tips 
fir the DoD focus area. Obviously there was much overlap as many "tips" supported 
more than one focus area. This was illustrated with a connection diagram (Ref. Figure 7). 
3. What areas of acquisition reform are being employed to execute the 
program? 
The next task was to identify which of these integrated initiatives had been 
applied to the BCT acquisition. The following initiatives were employed by PM-BCT to 
support the RFP preparation and the source selection processes. The goals were reduced 
cycle time and enhanced communications with prospective contractors, anticipating the 
additional payoffs in system performance and reduced total ownership costs. 
The PM office relied heavily on the four initiatives announced in the 9 November 
2000 Commerce Business Daily. The four initiatives established the intent to complete a 
market survey, to request industry White Papers, to hold an Advanced Planning Brief to 
Industry, and to compete the IAV contract. The multiple acquisition reform initiatives 
were addressed in detail in Chapter IV and are summarized here. 
The first initiative, market survey, involved two exhaustive efforts, one with 
industry and one within the Army. The first effort was the Platform Performance 
Demonstration. Industry delivered 35 vehicles to Ft. Knox Kentucky and demonstrated 
them in January 2000, just two months after the program announcement. These 
demonstrations were conducted in the systems' intended environments. Seventy experts 
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from the Army's combat vehicle community evaluated operations and made assessments 
both from an operational standpoint to help refine the operational requirements, but also 
from a technology insertion standpoint. The second point is critical. The Army knew 
that in order to achieve the current transformation effort, it had to accept the capabilities 
of the vehicles without performing a protracted engineering and development effort. 
Through time-phased system development, developers could devise block improvements 
to the systems and insert technology that the systems did not initially possess. This 
supported the Army's desire to deliver a capability rapidly, revise its doctrine and war 
fighting plans, and then reset the needs of the objective force. 
The second initiative was the Advanced Planning Brief to Industry. This was 
essentially a notice to industry of what the Army was going to do and what help it 
needed. While difficult to assess quantitative improvements to the acquisition process, 
the qualitative improvements were seen in the cooperation received from industry and the 
quality of the proposals received. 
The third initiative, White Papers, provided affirmation of the Army's 
requirements as an output of the process. More significant, though, was the outcome of 
the process, the significant improvement in the proposals received. The White Paper 
process was not "explosively" revealing as the PM had hoped. The PM had a team 
review the papers and found the following eight substantive comments: obvious schedule 
risks due the speed at which the program was moving, the lack of a clear logistics 
concept, the appearance of skewed requirements towards wheeled vehicle solutions 
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complex requirements that precluded off-the-shelf vehicle solutions, the 
misunderstanding of the bid sample event as part of the source selection process, 
establishing industry Government partnering, the need for a system integrator, and the 
lack of a good definition of First Unit Equipped. 
As the White Paper process occurred before the release of the second Draft RFP, 
the PM office addressed each of the eight comments and incorporated relevant changes 
into the RFP. 
The fourth initiative involved the use of full and open competition. There seemed 
to be hesitation by the offerors to discuss the schedule changes and counter to normal 
practice, contractors did not immediately ask for more time to develop their proposals. 
This was partly due the obvious emphasis that GEN Shinseki had placed on the schedule 
but also partly due the competition. The PM did not receive one statement, during two 
rounds of question and answer, that an offeror could not meet the Army's requirements or 
timeline. 
In addition, the PM office also built strong ties with its TRADOC counterparts. 
Together, they employed intensive and iterative management to generate the operational 
requirements in less than six months. This is normally a drawn out process that involves 
various TRADOC schools and numerous iterations of the requirements documents. The 
requirements were supported by TRADOC's own analysis that it performed at several 
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locations using multiple analytical and modeling and simulation software tools. They 
developed and validated the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and met acquisition 
reform goals at the same time by only requiring 5 KPPs. 
Through intensive involvement of industry and TRADOC, the PM office 
simultaneously developed the performance requirements for the IAV at the same time 
that TRADOC was refining the operational requirements. Both of these efforts were 
supported heavily by what industry told the Army they could deliver off-the-shelf within 
the desired program schedule. 
As the process neared the release of the formal RFP, prospective offerors were 
provided more Q&A opportunities up to the point of the submittal of proposals. This 
kept communications channels open while TRADOC refined the operational 
requirements and validated the KPPs. After proposals were submitted, the Source 
Selection Evaluation Board continued to communicate with the offerors both in writing 
as well as orally via teleconference and face-to-face discussions. 
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages that acquisition reform 
brings to the BCT? 
Of the available acquisition reform initiatives, the PM office found the following 
to be the most useful to develop the RFP: extensive market surveys, Draft RFPs with 
Question and Answer sessions, White Papers, advanced planning briefs to industry, full 
and open competition, streamlined acquisition, model contracting, extensive discussions 
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including face-to-face as well as written, a performance-based Statement of Work, 
performance-based requirements, and electronic commerce. 
One of the goals of thesis was to identify and discuss both the advantages and 
disadvantages of acquisition reform: the good and the bad. However, in completing the 
research, it was evident that although there seemed to be many advantages there were no 
apparent disadvantages. Therefore, the analysis of the good and bad results of applying 
acquisition reform emerged as two main observations. First, acquisition reform 
initiatives were being used to improve the entire acquisition process, but did not 
necessarily apply in all instances. The negative outcome of this, elongation of the source 
selection, was not due to applying acquisition reform as much as it was due to the 
complexities experienced in acquiring a very complicated major program. Second, some 
acquisition reform initiatives improved the RFP and supported the source selection 
process qualitatively without making improvements in the acquisition cycle time. This is 
a positive outcome, a qualitative improvement. I will describe these two observations in 
more detail below, in an unusual order: first, the reasons for the elongation of the process 
(i.e., disadvantages), and second, the qualitative improvements to the process (i.e., 
advantages). 
The three primary reasons for the elongation of the source selection process were 
the complexity of the IAV procurement, the complexity of some RFP attachments and 
changes late in the source selection process. First, the IAV procurement was more 
complex than the typical wheeled medium weight systems that TACOM has procured. 
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Further, the RFP contained multiple award options that caused the offerors to deliver up 
to three proposals each. This became more burdensome with the total number of 
proposals received. 
Second, the RFP contained several complex attachments with issues such as 
determination of GFE versus CFE for major items. These issues were difficult for the 
offerors to resolve and made the source selection more difficult, too. The use of GFE, 
although intended to help the offerors, actually constrained them and, in truth, ran counter 
to acquisition reform. The problems of GFE were compounded since nearly every 
amendment to the RFP included changes to the GFE list. 
Third, the PM office made finite changes to the RFP late in the source selection 
process: that is, within three months of the award. Although broad communications are a 
hallmark of acquisition reform and this program, these late changes contributed to delays 
of up to one month in the source selection process. 
The PM office made qualitative improvements to the source selection process that 
tended to offset some of the disadvantages that were identified above. The five primary 
qualitative improvements that the PM office made relative to acquisition reform were: a 
simplified Statement of Work with detailed attachments, the inclusion of contractual 
incentives, the inclusion of credit for exceeding the threshold and objective specification 
requirements, a Table LM connecting Sections L and M, and the continued use of 
discussions. The five primary changes made are described in more detail as follows. 
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First, The PM simplified the scope of work by including multiple detailed 
attachments. Although some of these were described as complex and contributed to the 
elongation of the source selection, the clarity to the RPP that the attachments provided far 
out weighed any complexities. 
Second, The PM made qualitative improvements in the procurement competition 
by including contractual incentives within each contract type and purpose. Some of the 
incentives were to avoid negative performance such as the late delivery dis-incentive but 
most were to reward positive performance such as the incentive fee and award fee 
portions. 
As a third qualitative improvement, the offerers were given credit in the source 
selection for exceeding the required or increasing the likelihood of meeting desired 
performance requirements. Depending on how much they exceeded the requirement and 
the priority of the requirement itself, the offerors were given credit as having 
performance advantages. 
The final two initiatives that qualitatively improved the source selection were the 
PM's creation of a new Table LM and the continued use of discussions. The new Table 
LM cross-walked proposal formatting requirements of Section L with the source 
selection evaluation aspect of Section M. The offerors were better able to read and 
understand how to prepare their proposal and how the Government would evaluate it, all 
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in one readable document. The continued use of discussions during source selection 
enhanced the common understanding of the RFP requirements by the offerers and the 
Government. 
5. What conclusions and follow-on recommendations can be drawn from 
applying acquisition reform to the BCT? 
Finally, I have concluded that the only way that the BCT effort could have been 
accomplished in the time frame was through the use of acquisition reform; barring the 
availability of an off-the-shelf exact match to the known requirements. 
In addition, the use of acquisition reform initiatives by the PM provided for a 
straightforward evaluation by the SSEB. The SSEB provided the basis for a sound 
decision by the SSA. This fact is most significant. The SSA pointed out that the two 
leading offerors were nearly balanced between performance with supportability and 
schedule with price/cost. Weighing in some of the qualitative differences, the SSA chose 
the proposal with the best value. These qualitative differences were part of the applied 
acquisition reform initiatives such as performance credit and commonality between the 
ICV and MGS variants.   Therefore, in spite of the fast pace at which the whole program 
moved, which brings on the higher probabilities of error, the GAO supported the Army's 
production award decision. 
Finally, I recommend that the Army add this case to the Defense Acquisition 
Deskbook as an example of a positive outcome stemming from the use of acquisition 
reform. One can clearly see how acquisition reform was used across the whole spectrum 
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of initiatives. From a highly trained acquisition workforce listening to their industry 
partners to a detailed Statement of Work attachments and novel Table LM, the PM 
developed a program that delivered a commercially available product that was executable 
within the given time constraints that meets the users needs. This was all accomplished 
while maintaining a sight on the end-state, which was to deliver integrated off-the-shelf 
technology as an interim solution to the Army's present needs. The acquisition schedule 
should be the model by which future programs can mold themselves. 
The unusual spirit of cooperation between the senior Army management, combat 
developer, materiel developer, tester, and offeror/contractor surely made this program a 
success. The only limitation might be trying to apply this model to programs needing 
longer development time; it appears to be too speedy to support a drawn out development 
process. 
C.       RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
I therefore recommend the following for further research: 
1. Conclusively determine if the capabilities delivered by the IAV vehicles meet 
the Army's need for a strategically deployable force. This includes the 
deployability, mobility, survivability, and lethality that are inherently 
necessary for the BCT to be effective in its role. 
2. After fielding, reinvestigate the effects of acquiring the IAV vehicles using 
acquisition reform and accelerated acquisition. Two to three years after 
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fielding, the effectiveness of the LAV III, to meet the Army's needs, will be 
more clear. This will reevaluate the basic question; Did the Army move too 
fast? 
3. Document the deployment of off-the-shelf vehicles and how they have 
affected the Army's Future Combat System. That is, since off-the-shelf 
combat vehicles were acquired in 2001 and the technology break point for 
FCS is only 2003, should the Army delay the FCS program to achieve a larger 
leap ahead in technology? 
4. Operation and support savings (i.e., decreased supportability) predictions were 
a contributing factor in the source selection process of the IAV. What O & S 
savings has the Army really achieved by buying a medium weight, wheeled 
vehicle system? 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
-A- 
ACATID Acquisition Category ID (DoD level approval) 
ACR Armored Calvary Regiment 
ADEA Army Development and Employment Agency 
AGMS Armored Ground Mobility System 
AGS Armored Gun System 
AMC Army Materiel Command 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
APBI Advance Planning Brief to Industry 
APS Army Posture Statement 
ASARC Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 
ATC Aberdeen Test Center 
ATEC US Army Test and Evaluation Command 
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile vehicle 
AUS A Association of United States Army 
-B- 
BCT Brigade Combat Team 
BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Office 
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 
-C- 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
CATV Cost as an Independent Variable 
CBD Commerce Business Daily 
CBTDEV Combat Developer 
CD Compact Disc 
CE Comparative Evaluation 
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment 
CLS Contractor Logistics Support 
COL Colonel, Army 
CONUS Continental United States 
CPAF Cost-Plus-Award-Fee 
CPIF Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee 
CS A Chief of Staff of the Army 




Defense Acquisition Board 















Engineer Squad Vehicle 
Executive Summary 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Future Combat System 
Firm Fixed Price 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 
Fire Support Vehicle 










General Accounting Office 
Government-Furnished Equipment 
General (Army Four Star) 
Garbage In Garbage Out 
General Motors 
General Motors/General Dynamics Land Systems, L.L.C. 
General Officers (One Star and above) 
-H- 
HEMMT        Heavy Expand Mobility Medium Truck 
HTTB High Technology Test Bed 
HQTRADOC Headquarters Training and Doctrine Command 
HMMWV      High Mobility, Multi-purpose, Wheeled Vehicle 
-I- 
IAV Interim Armored Vehicle 
IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Tear 
ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle 
ID Infantry Division 
IFD Item for Discussion 
IFB Invitation for Bid 
ILO In Lieu Of (instead of) 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
ITV Improved TOW Vehicle 
-K- 
KPH Kilometers Per Hour 










































Light Armored Vehicle 
Light Armored Vehicle, third generation, General Motors of Canada 
Low Rate Initial Production 
Lieutenant Colonel, Army 
Lieutenant General (Army Three Star) 
Modeling and Simulation 
Medium Armored Vehicle 
Major, Army 
Manpower and Personnel Integration 
Materiel Developer 
Medical Evacuation Vehicle 
Medium Combat Team 
Mortar Carrier vehicle 
Mobile Gun System 
Major General (Army Two Star) 
Major Theatre War 
Nuclear Biological and Chemical 
Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle 
New Equipment Training 
New Organizational Team Training 
Operational and Organizational 
Overarching Integrated Product Teams 
Operational Tempo 
Operational Requirements Document 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation 
Public Broadcasting System 
Procurement Contracting Officer 
Production & Deployment, Operations & Support 
Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Support Systems 
Procurement Lead Time 
Program Manager 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Program Manager - Brigade Combat Team 





























Question and Answer 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability 
Request for Proposal 
Reconnaissance Vehicle 
Single Acquisition Management Plan 
Stability and Support Operations 
System Development and Demonstration 
Sergeant Major of the Army 
Subject Matter Experts 
Small Scale Contingency 
Single Process Initiative 
Source Selection Authority 
Source Selection Advisory Council 
Source Selection Evaluation Board 
Statement of Work 
Statement of Objectives 
US Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command 
Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center 
TRADOC Analysis Center 
US Army Training and Doctrine Command 
TRADOC Systems Manager 
TRADOC Systems Manager, Interim Armored Vehicle 
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